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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have always had a special role in making competition policy.
The open-textured language of the Sherman Act1 and other antitrust laws
has forced courts to fill a policy-making void that Congress has—with
rare exception—shown little desire to take back.2 When Congress has
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000).
2. As Robert Bork wrote:
The central institution in making antitrust law has been the Supreme Court.
That is true because the antitrust laws are so open-textured, leave so much to be
filled in by the judiciary, that the Court plays in antitrust almost as unconstrained
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enacted regulatory legislation, it has traditionally relied on methods
other than marketplace competition to achieve its goals.
The Telecommunications Act of 19963 breaks from that historical
paradigm. The Act is legislative competition policy-making that
stimulates rivalry in local telephone service principally by requiring
“incumbent local exchange carriers” (ILECs), the existing local
telephone companies, to interconnect with, and provide certain services
to “competitive local exchange carriers” (CLECs).4 When market entry
emerged more slowly than many had hoped, CLECs and consumers sued
the ILECs. The claims alleged that the ILECs failed to fulfill their duties
under the Telecom Act by unlawfully maintaining their monopoly power
in the local telephone service market in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.5 A CLEC executive described the genesis of one of these
a role as it does in constitutional law. . . . [E]ven if courts accept consumer
welfare as their sole guideline, they have been granted an exceptionally broad
mandate to make law.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 409 (1978)
(footnote omitted). While the language of the Clayton Act is somewhat clearer than that
of the Sherman Act, the court’s role is no less ambitious because “Congress has
indicated its belief that [certain practices] may—not always, but under circumstances
deliberately left undefined—injure competition.” Id. Courts are thus left with the goal
of making the policy choices. See IA PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶
240c3 (2d ed. 1997) (recognizing that antitrust cases often turn “on a court’s judgment
about the degree of social harm that might result from the challenged practice, the social
benefits that might be obtained through that practice, and the availability of significantly
less restrictive alternatives”).
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). Throughout this Article,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is also referred to as “the Telecom Act” or “the
1996 Act.”
4. The preamble to the Act states that it was designed “to promote competition
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.” Id. The House Conference Report explained that the
purpose of the Act was “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services . . . by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition . . . .” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996).
5. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129
(D.D.C. 2002); Nicholas Kulish et al., Ruling Opens Baby Bells Up to Suits: Court Lets
Customers Sue Local Phone Companies for Antitrust Violations, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2002, at A3 (referring to “dozens of lawsuits Bell competitors have filed against the
regional phone companies”); Pulver.Com, Telecom Antitrust Intelligence Report,
available at http://www.pulver.com/antitrustreport/research.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2002) (listing complaints filed and pleadings); Gail Lawyer, The Last Resort: Competitors
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cases—though he could have been referring to any of them—by
commenting that the ILEC “was trying to put us out of business like they
did all the other CLECs . . . . [The conduct of the ILEC] is costing consumers
in the states we serve billions of dollars in lost potential savings.”6 The
judicial response to these cases has been perplexing. Each court claims
to be applying the same law; all of the judges write with utter confidence
in the correctness of their analysis;7 and yet the courts reach two
diametrically opposite results. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have
held that the antitrust laws apply to local telephone companies as if the
1996 Act did not exist.8 But the Seventh Circuit and several district
courts have dismissed identical antitrust claims.9 The Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to resolve this dispute.10

Turn to Antitrust Actions Amid Mounting Frustration with ‘96 Act, XCHANGE MAGAZINE
(July 1, 2001), at http://www.xchangemag.com/articles/171front.html (identifying recent
antitrust cases).
6. Lawyer, supra note 5 (quoting Keith Machen, Vice President of Ntegrity,
charging Verizon with antitrust violations).
7. For example, in Covad’s case against BellSouth, Judge Martin recognized that
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
had disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s holding that antitrust claims could not be based
on conduct relating to duties created by the 1996 Act. Covad Communications Co. v.
BellSouth Corp., No. 1:00-CV-3414, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2001) (recognizing
that the DOJ and the FCC believed that antitrust claims “should be available for failing
to perform duties under the 1996 Act”). But Judge Martin rejected their views quite
abruptly, writing that “[i]f Congress . . . desire[s] to amend the 1996 Act . . . to
specifically include antitrust remedies for failing to perform affirmative duties, then [it]
may do so. In the meantime, this court’s role is to apply the current, correct and logical
interpretation of the 1996 Act and the Sherman Act.” Id.
8. See infra Part III.B.1. The Second Circuit’s holding was limited to cases
initiated by consumers. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305
F.3d 89, 112 n.19 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Our decision does not address whether LECs seeking
to enter the market may ever bring antitrust suits against the ILEC.”). While the Second
Circuit reserved judgment with respect to cases filed by CLECs, which represent a
majority of the cases, the court’s analysis is mirrored in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002),
and in amicus briefs filed jointly by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FCC in
cases that were initiated by competitors. See Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the
Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 13, Covad Communications
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C); Brief for the
United States and Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellants at 10–11, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.,
(11th Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ).
9. See infra Part III.B.2. Judge Tjoflat, in an opinion dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc in the Eleventh Circuit Covad case, expressed agreement with these
courts. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 314 F.3d 1282, 1288–90 (11th
Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
10. Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 123 S.
Ct. 1480 (2003) (mem.) (limiting grant of certiorari to the question: “Did the Court of
Appeals err in reversing the District Court’s dismissal of respondent’s antitrust
claims?”).
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This Article has two purposes: (1) to explain these conflicting results,
and (2) to propose a method to determine the appropriate degree of
connection between the antitrust laws and an industry-specific regulatory
statute that, like the Telecom Act, seeks to enhance competition. The
conflicting results in the telecom-antitrust cases arise because the courts
are struggling to deal with legislative competition policy-making. The
old strains of antitrust-regulatory accommodation doctrine were
designed for situations in which the legislature sought to advance public
policy goals other than competition.11 By contrast, accommodating the
1996 Act requires the court to determine how best to achieve the single
goal of enhancing competition. None of the courts deciding telecomantitrust cases have recognized that this distinction creates the need for
different doctrinal tools.12
Harmonizing antitrust and competition-enhancing, industry-specific
regulation requires careful contextual analysis. To say, as the Seventh
Circuit has, that the specific duties and regulatory structures created by
the Telecom Act displace antitrust scrutiny begs the question: Would
displacement of the antitrust laws help achieve the Telecom Act’s goal
of stimulating competition in local telephone service? It would be odd
for Congress to displace antitrust enforcement if it did not. Similarly, to
say, as the Second and Eleventh Circuits have, that antitrust continues to
apply as if there were no Telecom Act begs the same question: Would
11. To be sure, regulation has often sought to protect consumers from price
gouging, which is one of the goals of antitrust and competition policy. But traditional
consumer-welfare-oriented regulation relied on a direct price control mechanism of one
sort or another rather than marketplace competition to achieve its goals. Further,
competition-enhancing policy has much broader goals than preventing price gouging. See
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990).
[T]he “Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition
will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.” This
judgment “recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety,
and durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the
free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”
Id. (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (explaining that antitrust law “rests
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress”).
12. See infra note 34. As of the time of this writing, the one commentary on this
type of litigation similarly fails to perceive this distinction. See Megan Delany, The
Dominos of Goldwasser: Only Congress Can Stop the Toppling Effect Before the Game
Is Over, 10 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 279, 292–97 (2002) (concluding that Goldwasser was
wrongly decided without considering antitrust-regulatory accommodation doctrine).
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simply overlaying antitrust enforcement on top of competitionenhancing regulation advance the goal of spurring competition? It
depends. The regulation may carefully structure an industry in ways that
could be undone if standard antitrust duties were imposed. In such a
case, courts should refrain from applying antitrust law. In other cases,
regulation may enable the courts to apply the antitrust laws more
aggressively. By declaring that certain conduct is anticompetitive within
the regulated industry, the legislature makes competition policy—it
creates a bright line that minimizes the concern that aggressive
enforcement would chill procompetitive behavior.
This Article explores six ways that courts might account for a
competition-enhancing regulatory statute when considering an antitrust
challenge. These six degrees of connection range from creating a
blanket exemption from antitrust attack to treating violations of the
regulatory statute as per se antitrust violations. In choosing among these
options, a court should engage in a two-step analysis. First, it should ask
whether recognizing antitrust duties concurrently with regulatory duties
would reduce the regulatory statute’s effectiveness in fostering
competition. If it would, then the court should find that the regulated
conduct falls outside the scope of antitrust. If antitrust enforcement
would not hinder the regulation’s effectiveness, the court should proceed
to the second step and ask how, if at all, the duties created by the
regulation should affect antitrust analysis.
A court applying this test in a telecom-antitrust case should find, at the
first step, that the 1996 Act would be enhanced if the court also imposed
antitrust duties on ILECs. At the second step, the court should find that
a plaintiff, who proves that an ILEC with market power has violated a
nontrivial regulatory duty imposed by the 1996 Act, is entitled to a
presumption that the violation substantially contributed to the
maintenance of the ILEC’s market power. The language and structure of
the 1996 Act, however, indicate that defendants should retain the right to
show that there are procompetitive reasons for violating a duty imposed
by the 1996 Act, and plaintiffs should retain the burden of rebutting
those justifications.
Part II of this Article introduces the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
focusing on the provisions that are intended to stimulate competition in
local telephone service. It then summarizes the allegations in the
telecom-antitrust cases. Part III sets out the established law of antitrustregulatory accommodation and describes how the differing results in the
telecom-antitrust cases can be explained by the courts’—sometimes
explicit and sometimes implicit—reliance on two different lines of
doctrine: implied immunity and antitrust state action. Part IV explains
that neither doctrine is an appropriate analytical model for the telecom-
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antitrust cases because the Telecom Act, unlike the regulation considered
in prior cases, is designed to enhance competition. This section then sets
out the two-step inquiry to determine the appropriate degree of antitrustregulatory connection. Part V applies that analysis to the Telecom Act.
II. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
This Part briefly traces the events leading up to the 1996 Act and
describes the Act’s local competition provisions. It then summarizes the
various antitrust cases that have been filed against the ILECs.
A. Events Leading to the Enactment of the Telecom Act
A summary of the Telecom Act’s local competition provisions must
start with the 1984 breakup of the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T). Through the early 1980s, virtually all telephone
service in the United States was provided by regulated monopolies. By
the end of the decade, much had changed. Public and private antitrust
cases against AT&T led to a restructuring of the telephony industry
under the auspices of a consent decree known as the “modified final
judgment” (MFJ).13 That decree sought to stimulate competition in long
distance telephone service by stripping AT&T of its local service
monopolies and forcing it to compete on a more level playing field with
MCI and other competitive entrants into the long distance telephone
service market.14

13. MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that local distribution facilities were “essential facilities” and
therefore AT&T must provide MCI access to them); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195–200 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom., Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (approving a consent decree that imposed on local
service providers a duty to share access to local telephone networks with competitive
long distance providers). For an analysis of the legal theories undermining the cases see
Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States
v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 295–326 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. &
Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
14. “[A]ccess to AT&T’s local network is crucial if long distance carriers . . . are
to be viable competitors.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 223. The divestiture of
the local operating companies from the Bell System “will sever the relationship between
this local monopoly and the other, competitive segments of AT&T, and it will thus
ensure—certainly better than could any other type of relief—that the practices which
allegedly have lain heavy on the telecommunications industry will not recur.” Id.
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The MFJ divided AT&T’s local service operations into seven
geographically separate companies.15 Each was a monopoly provider of
local service in its own region, but the decree prohibited these local
service providers from competing in the long distance market.16 The
MFJ left local service in the hands of monopoly providers because the
government then believed that efficient competition in the local market
was not possible.17 By the 1990s, technological advancements had
undermined the MFJ’s assumption that competition could not exist at the
local level.18 Congress concluded, however, that local competition
would be unlikely to emerge in the short term without industry-specific
legislation.19
B. The Telecom Act’s Local Competition Provisions
In 1996 Congress acted. The Telecom Act supplanted the MFJ with a
new framework designed to increase competition throughout the
telecommunications industry, but particularly with respect to local
telephone service.20 The Act prohibited states from enforcing regulatory
statutes that blocked competitive entry into local service markets21 and
imposed a series of affirmative duties on local telephone companies,
beginning with a general duty to interconnect.22 The Act also imposed
specific duties including:
15. Id. at 141, 142 & n.41.
16. Id. at 143.
17. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 413–14 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell
Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[t]he rationale for
allowing monopolies in the local phone service market was the belief that having more
than one local provider would lead to unwarranted duplication in the physical connecting
wires through which local calls are transmitted”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 673 F.
Supp. 525, 537–38 (D.D.C. 1987); PETER HUBER ET AL., THE GEODDESIC NETWORK II:
1993 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 2.3–2.5 (1992).
18. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371 (“Technological advances . . . have made
competition among multiple providers of local service seem possible . . . .”).
19. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,508 (1996).
[T]he removal of statutory and regulatory barriers to entry into the local
exchange and exchange access markets, while a necessary precondition to
competition, is not sufficient to ensure that competition will supplant
monopolies. . . . Congress addressed these problems in the 1996 Act by
mandating that the most significant economic impediments to efficient entry
into the monopolized local market must be removed.
Id.
20. See supra Part I; supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000); see Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 416 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “the Act permits new local
entry by dismantling existing legal barriers that would otherwise inhibit it”).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a).
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(1) a ban on prohibiting the resale of telephone service,
(2) a requirement that customers who switch carriers be allowed
keep their telephone numbers,
(3) a prohibition on discriminatory access requirements, such as
the need to dial more numbers with certain providers,
(4) a duty to share access to rights of way for cable or wire, and
(5) a duty to enter “reciprocal compensation arrangements for the
transport and termination of telecommunications.”23
In addition to these general duties placed on all competitors in the
local service market, Congress imposed additional obligations on the
ILECs. It explicitly required them to negotiate in good faith with respect
to the generally applicable requirements of the Act,24 and it created five
specific positive duties:
(1) to interconnect with potential competitors “at any technically
feasible point within the carrier’s network . . . that is at least
equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier
to itself” or any other party,
(2) to provide potential competitors with unbundled access—at a
cost-based royalty plus reasonable profit—to elements of the
ILEC’s own network,
(3) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any service that the ILEC
provides to its customers,
(4) to notify other carriers of changes to the network that would
affect interoperability with other networks, and
(5) to rent potential competitors the space needed for their
interconnection and other necessary equipment.25
Recognizing that these provisions would require extensive cooperation
among telecommunications providers, Congress required an ILEC to enter
negotiations with a CLEC whenever interconnection was requested.26
The parties were permitted, but not required, to ask state regulators to
participate as mediators in pursuit of a voluntary agreement.27 If an
agreement was not reached between 135 and 160 days after the initial
request, either party was empowered to seek compulsory arbitration by
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. § 251(b).
Id. § 251(c)(1).
Id. § 251(c)(2)–(6).
Id. § 252(a)–(b).
Id. § 252(a)(2).
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state regulators, who must then resolve all open issues within nine months
of the initial request.28 In all events, state regulatory commissions must
approve all agreements and the FCC was empowered to step in if a state
commission failed to fulfill its obligations.29 Once an agreement was in
place, the specific terms of the agreement rather than the language of the
statute would govern the relationship between the ILEC and the CLEC.30
The 1996 Act sought to encourage the ILECs to comply with the
duties it imposed by permitting an ILEC to provide long distance service
to its own local customers if it demonstrated that its local telephone
service market was open to competition.31 To meet this obligation, an
ILEC had to make available a “competitive checklist” of interconnection
and related services.32 While this potential for entry into the long
distance market provided a “carrot” to encourage ILECs to cooperate
with competitors in local service markets, the 1996 Act was remarkably
short of “sticks” to either compel compliance if an ILEC had little
interest in providing long distance service or to ensure continued
compliance once an ILEC satisfied the competitive checklist.33
C. The Telecom-Antitrust Complaints
Consumers and CLECs have charged the ILECs with monopolizing
the local telephone service market by frustrating the procompetitive aims
of the 1996 Act and thereby maintaining their own monopolistic
position. To date, courts have ruled on at least a dozen motions to
dismiss antitrust cases based on violations of the 1996 Act.34 The cases
28. Id. § 252(b).
29. Id. § 252(e).
30. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 103
(2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[w]hile the duties regulating ILECs enumerated in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 appear at first glance to be freestanding, in
practice, section 251 envisions that these duties will be implemented through state
approved contracts between the [CLEC] and the ILEC”).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1), (c), (d)(3). The 1996 Act immediately permitted an
ILEC to compete to provide long distance service to customers in regions in which it did
not provide local service. Id. § 271(b)(2).
32. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B).
33. Joel I. Klein, The Race for Local Competition: A Long Distance Run, Not a
Sprint, Address Before the American Enterprise Institute 7 (Nov. 5, 1997), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1268.htm (then-Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ describing the carrot and stick approach of the 1996
Act as follows: “As for the ‘sticks,’ there are real questions at this point; the Act itself
calls for no real penalties for non-compliance . . . .”).
34. Numerous cases dismissed antitrust claims based on violations of the 1996
Act. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2002);
Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v. Verizon Va. Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va. 2002); Covad
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:00-CV-3414, slip op. (N.D. Ga. July 6,
2001), rev’d, 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002); Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc. v.
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span the country. Potential competitors in local telephone services sued
BellSouth, Verizon, and Pacific Bell in Florida, Virginia, and California,
respectively. A provider of high speed Internet access sued BellSouth
and Bell Atlantic in Georgia and the District of Columbia. And
telephone service consumers filed class actions against Ameritech and
Bell Atlantic in Chicago and New York. The allegations in each case
are essentially identical, that the ILECs were complying with the 1996
Act, if at all, in the most grudging way possible in order to stifle
competition. Some of the complaints highlight that this conduct violates
the Act,35 while others focus on more traditional antitrust theories36—the
refusal to deal37 and the essential facilities38 doctrines—but at root, all of
the cases advanced essentially the same monopoly maintenance claim.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 99-1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816
(S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001); MGC Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.,
146 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003)
(limited to the question: “Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the District Court’s
dismissal of respondent’s antitrust claims?”); Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., No. 97-C6788, 1998 WL 60878 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1998) (dismissing the consumer class action
complaint), aff’d on other grounds, 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000). In other cases, courts
refused to dismiss antitrust claims based on violations of the Act.
Covad
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002); Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 294 F.3d 307, 311 (2d Cir. 2002)
(consumer case reserving judgment on competitor claims); Davis v. Pac. Bell, 204 F.
Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (agreeing with Goldwasser and its progeny that “a
violation of the Telecommunications Act ‘does not automatically equate to a violation of
the Sherman Act,’” but holding “that an allegation that a defendant violated the
Telecommunications Act in a ‘predatory’ manner as defined in Aspen Skiing states a
cause of action under the Sherman Act”); Stein v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 975,
985–86 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (same, but dismissing with leave to amend because the claim, as
alleged, failed to attribute damages to the plausible antitrust claim); Electronet Intermedia
Consulting, Inc. v. Sprint-Fla., Inc., No. 4:00-CV-0176-RH (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2000).
35. See, e.g., Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 394–95; Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys.,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816, at *9, *14.
36. See, e.g., Cavalier Tel., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 611. The court explained that while
the plaintiff “avoids such tell-tale references [to the 1996 Act] in its Complaint, it is
nevertheless clear that [it] alleges nothing more than violations of duties imposed on
Verizon by the 1996 Act.” Id. at 613. That the plaintiff “did not characterize its allegations
as violations of the 1996 Act,” the court explained, was “beside the point. Such a shallow
interpretation of the relationship between the 1996 Act and antitrust law would relegate the
matter to a mindless word game played out at the pleading stage . . . . The correct test is
whether the factual allegations contained in the Complaint amount to antitrust violations.” Id.
37. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985).
38. See MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33
(7th Cir. 1983).
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Covad Communications’ allegations against BellSouth are illustrative.
The 1996 Act required the ILECs to make space available on their
premises as necessary for interconnection, a requirement known as
collocation.39 While BellSouth entered interconnection agreements with
Covad, the new competitor accused BellSouth, inter alia, of: (1)
“regularly misrepresent[ing] the availability of space,” (2) ”severely
delay[ing] Covad’s application for collocation by months,” and (3)
“strategically understaffing its wholesale divisions and refusing to
develop electronic systems for placing orders.”40 As a result of these
alleged improprieties, Covad claimed that BellSouth had intentionally
“thwarted Covad’s aggressive first-to-market strategy, caused [it] to lose
customers, and devastated [its] ability to deliver high quality service” in
competition with BellSouth.41
In an unregulated market, these claims would state a cause of action
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs alleged both
elements of a section 2 claim—that the defendants had (1) monopoly
power in the relevant market for local telephone service and (2) engaged
in predatory acts—acts intended to exclude competition with no
procompetitive purpose or legitimate business justification.42 The
question for the courts is whether the existence of the 1996 Act alters
that conclusion. The Second and Eleventh Circuits and the enforcement
agencies have said no. But the Seventh Circuit and a majority of district
courts have dismissed these antitrust claims on the pleadings.

39. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (2000).
40. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:00-CV-3414, slip op. at
4 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2001); see also Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2002) (where the plaintiff alleged that Bell Atlantic
discriminated in favor of its own customers); Cavalier Tel., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 612
(explaining Cavalier’s allegations “that Verizon mis-routed Cavalier’s calls, . . . supplied
Cavalier with an inferior Web interface for use in ordering loops, . . . and . . .
intentionally made the billing process for loops costly for its competitors”).
41. Covad, No. 1:00-CV-3414 at 4; see also Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222
F.3d 390, 394–95 (7th Cir. 2000) (alleging that Ameritech engaged in twenty specific
exclusionary practices, each of which amounted to a violation of a duty imposed under
the 1996 Act); Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No.
99-1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816, at *9 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001)
(alleging that BellSouth’s refusal to provide access hindered competition with BellSouth
directly and also made future competition more difficult by destroying business
relationships between Supra and its customers).
42. The elements of a section 2 Sherman Act violation are: (1) the willful acquisition,
maintenance, or extension of monopoly power (2) by the use of exclusionary or
predatory conduct, “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to
destroy a competitor.” United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); see Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
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III. THE LAW OF ANTITRUST-REGULATORY ACCOMMODATION AND
THE TELECOM-ANTITRUST CASES
This Part reviews existing antitrust-regulatory accommodation law
and explains that the Supreme Court has misleadingly developed two
lines of doctrine: (1) implied immunity, which is said to focus on
conflict, and (2) antitrust state action, which looks to government
supervision.43 In fact, the Supreme Court cases turn on the presence of
official oversight of anticompetitive conduct allegedly serving the
noncompetition public policy goals of industry-specific regulatory
statutes. Conflict, as that term is normally understood, is not a critical
factor. After reviewing the Supreme Court cases, this Part shows that
the Second and Eleventh Circuits have mistakenly relied on the absence
of conflict, while the Seventh Circuit has, perhaps unconsciously, relied
on the presence of supervision. As Part IV explains, this doctrine was
developed to accommodate antitrust and regulation that serves a goal
other than competition. Neither approach is adequate where regulation,
like the Telecom Act, is intended to enhance competition.
A. The Existing Law of Antitrust-Regulatory Accommodation
Historically, the courts have employed two different lines of authority
to determine the impact of industry-specific regulation on the antitrust
laws. Particularly in cases of federal regulation, the courts have employed
the implied immunity doctrine, which holds that a conflict between a
regulatory scheme and the Sherman Act will block antitrust scrutiny of

43. A third approach to antitrust-regulatory accommodation is known as the
Keogh or filed rate doctrine. It holds that a private treble damage action will not lie
when the plaintiff attacks a rate that has been filed and approved by a regulatory body
even if the rate was collusively set, and the plaintiff proves that it would have been lower
absent the collusion. See Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 160–62 (1922).
While some of the telecom-antitrust cases have mentioned this doctrine, for example,
Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 402, it has no relevance to the argument advanced here. The
Keogh doctrine does not alter the antitrust duties imposed on regulated entities; it merely
insulates them from treble damage liability, leaving antitrust duties in place and
enforceable through criminal or injunctive actions. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 422 & n.28 (1986) (“Keogh simply held that an award
of treble damages is not an available remedy” when a rate is filed with and approved by
a regulatory body; a regulated defendant’s conduct remains “within the reach of the
generally applicable antitrust laws.”).
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the defendant’s conduct.44 In cases of state regulation, the courts have
asked whether conduct that would violate the antitrust laws furthers
private interests or the state’s regulatory vision. This doctrine, known as
antitrust state action, holds that conduct that is (1) undertaken pursuant
to a state policy to displace competition with regulation and (2) actively
supervised by governmental actors will be deemed to serve the state’s
regulatory vision and will not be scrutinized under the antitrust laws.45
While these two lines of authority appear to ask quite different
questions, the holdings in the cases turn on a single issue: whether the
legislature has provided for sufficient governmental oversight of
potentially anticompetitive conduct. Where it has, antitrust scrutiny has
been deemed unnecessary.
1. Implied Immunities Are Disfavored
Implied antitrust immunities as a result of industry-specific regulation are
said to be “strongly disfavored.”46 The U.S. Supreme Court has explained
that the antitrust laws embody a “fundamental national economic policy” in
favor of competition.47 While Congress may put that policy aside in pursuit
of other public policy goals, in the absence of specific language, courts
assume that Congress intended to limit antitrust enforcement only to the
minimum extent necessary to achieve some alternative public policy goal.48
44. See infra Part III.A.1.
45. See infra Part III.A.2.
46. See Square D, 476 U.S. at 421 (explaining that “exemptions from the antitrust
laws are strictly construed and strongly disfavored”).
47. Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388
(1981) (quoting Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966)).
48. In National Gerimedical Hospital, the Court summarized the implied
immunity doctrine as follows:
The antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy. Implied
antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be justified only by a convincing
showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory
system. Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the
[subsequent law] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.
This is the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statutory schemes.
Id. at 388–89 (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Square D, 476 U.S. at 421; United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51
(1963); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956).
The Court has employed the implied immunity doctrine to justify the narrow
interpretation of regulatory statutes that explicitly state an intent to immunize certain
conduct from antitrust attack. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S.
726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966).
We have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental
national economic policy and have therefore concluded that we cannot lightly
assume that the enactment of a special regulatory scheme for particular aspects
of an industry was intended to render the more general provisions of the
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For example, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,49 the plaintiff
brought antitrust claims against the Exchange and its members for
collectively refusing to provide private communication lines connecting
the plaintiff’s offices to members of the Exchange.50 These lines were
alleged to be essential to the firm’s ability to compete effectively,51 and
outside the context of a regulated industry, the Exchange members’
concerted refusal to provide the lines to nonmembers would have
violated the antitrust laws.52
The Exchange argued that its conduct should be exempt because the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required it to regulate its members.53
The Second Circuit agreed because the Exchange’s conduct “was within
the general scope of the authority of the Exchange as defined by the
1934 Act.”54 But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a general
power to adopt rules” that might have anticompetitive effects does not
mean that “particular applications of such rules” will never violate the
antitrust laws.55 An exemption from antitrust scrutiny could be implied
“only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary.”56 After reviewing the
application of the rule in the case before it, the Court concluded that the
Exchange’s conduct was not necessary to make the Exchange Act work,
and held that antitrust scrutiny was appropriate.57
2. Regulated Conduct Supervised by Public Actors Falls Outside the
Scope of the Antitrust Laws
Silver is often read to require a search for conflict between the
regulatory legislation and the antitrust laws. In fact, however, the
presence or absence of a conflict has little to do with the decision
whether to apply the antitrust laws to the regulated industry. Indeed, the
conflict in Silver could not have been more clear. The rule directly

Id.

antitrust laws wholly inapplicable to that industry.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

373 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 344–45, 348.
Id. at 345.
15 U.S.C. § 78a–mm (1997).
Silver, 373 U.S. at 346–47.
Id. at 357, 367.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 361–67.
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restrained competition that the antitrust laws would otherwise require.
The result in Silver was dependent not on the absence of conflict, but on
a lack of direct governmental oversight of the challenged conduct. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had the power to review the
Exchange’s rules, but not specific applications of those rules.58 Given
the private genesis of the Exchange’s anticompetitive decisions and the
lack of governmental oversight, a complete exemption from antitrust
scrutiny would have “defeat[ed] the congressional policy reflected in the
antitrust laws without serving the policy of the Securities Exchange
Act.”59 But, the Court stressed, if review of Exchange self-regulation
were provided by a governmental entity, “a different case as to antitrust
exemption would be presented.”60
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,61 the Court encountered
that “different case,”62 challenging the Exchange’s collective setting of
commissions. As in Silver, the regulation (1) granted the Exchange the
self-regulatory power necessary to take the challenged action, and (2)
contemplated that anticompetitive effects might flow from that action in
the process of serving other public policy goals. In contrast to Silver,
however, the SEC had the power to oversee rate setting and had actively
supervised the process.63 As a result, the Court held that the Exchange’s
58. Id. at 357–58.
59. Id. at 360.
60. Id.; see also Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452
U.S. 378, 389–91 (1981) (explaining that “[i]ntent to repeal the antitrust laws is much
clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or require the type of
conduct under antitrust challenge”); cf. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
351–52 (1963) (applying antitrust laws despite governmental regulation, and explaining
that “the range and scope of administrative powers under the Bank Merger Act bear little
resemblance to those involved” in a prior case where the antitrust laws were held
inapplicable).
61. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
62. Id. at 685 (“It is patent that the case presently at bar is, indeed, that ‘different
case’ to which the Court in Silver referred.”).
63. The Court explained that “[i]n contrast to the circumstances of Silver,” the
SEC here had “direct regulatory power over” collective rate setting. Id. “Since 1934,”
the Court observed, “all rate changes have been brought to the attention of the SEC, and
it has taken an active role in review of proposed rate changes . . . .” Id. In distinguishing
a lower court securities case that found no immunity, the Court explained that “there was
no evidence presented regarding the extent of SEC review of the challenged rule.” Id. at
686–87. The Court distinguished Philadelphia National Bank on similar grounds: “there
was an absence of continuing oversight by the Comptroller General of the Currency.” Id.
at 689–90 n.14. Finally, Justice Douglas emphasized the point in his concurring opinion:
The mere existence of a statutory power of review by the SEC over fixed
commission rates cannot justify immunizing those rates from antitrust
challenges. . . . Only if the SEC is actively and aggressively exercising its
powers of review and approval can we be sure that fixed commission rates are
being monitored in the manner which Congress intended.
Id. at 691–92 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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collective rate setting was not subject to antitrust scrutiny.64
The federal regulation cases demonstrate that the deciding factor is the
degree of government oversight rather than the extent of the conflict
between regulatory and antitrust duties.65 But what does governmental
involvement have to do with accommodating two statutory regimes?
The answer rests on an understanding of the nature of antitrust as a
mechanism to control privately motivated business decisions, but not
governmental conduct. Where public actors oversee regulated conduct,
the activity loses its character as privately motivated conduct. Antitrust
is therefore inapplicable.66
This characterization of antitrust-regulatory accommodation has
received more attention in cases and commentary when courts review
state regulation.67 The Court’s 1943 decision in Parker v. Brown68 held
64. Id. at 685–86. In United States v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694 (1975), the Court held the antitrust laws inapplicable to certain mutual fund
activities. Id. at 733. The Court explained:
There can be little question that the broad regulatory authority conferred upon
the SEC by the Maloney and Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor
the activities questioned . . . and the history of Commission regulations
suggests no laxity in the exercise of this authority. To the extent that any of
appellees’ ancillary activities frustrate the SEC’s regulatory objectives it has
ample authority to eliminate them.
Id. at 734 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973), the Court held regulated conduct outside the scope of antitrust
law. Id. at 387. The Court explained:
[W]here, as here, the [governmental body] authorizes control of an air carrier
to be acquired by another person or corporation, and where it specifically
authorizes as in the public interest specific transactions between the parent and
the subsidiary, the way in which that control is exercised in those precise
situations is under the surveillance of the [governmental body], not in the
hands of those who can invoke the sanctions of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 387.
65. For example, the Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau
permitted antitrust attacks on regulated rates that were filed and approved, although it did
prohibit the award of damages. 476 U.S. 409, 422 (1986); see also Nat’l Gerimedical
Hosp., 452 U.S. at 389 (explaining that “[i]ntent to repeal the antitrust laws is much
clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or require the type of
conduct under antitrust challenge,” and “antitrust repeals are especially disfavored where
the antitrust implications of a business decision have not been considered by a
governmental entity”).
66. See Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 236–39 (2000); Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust
Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 672, 697–703 (1991).
67. IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 242d (“Although distinctive in
origin, historical justification, and verbal formulation, the rationale for the ‘state action’
doctrine creating immunity from federal antitrust [review] for state and local government
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that federal law did not preempt a state regulatory program because the
Sherman Act was not meant “to restrain state action or official action
directed by a state.”69 The doctrine is governed by a two-part test that
asks whether the state (1) “clearly articulated” its intent to displace
competition with regulation, and (2) “actively supervised” the private
parties in the regulated market.70
As applied, the test asks first whether the state has articulated a
general intent to displace the forces of the free market with some form of
state regulation.71 To be considered state action in this context, an
anticompetitive byproduct of economic regulation need only be a
foreseeable result of a particular statute; it need not be compelled or even
necessary to the regulatory scheme.72 The so-called clear articulation
prong of the test requires a party to point to legislation that has been (or,
if not yet interpreted, could reasonably be) read by state courts, agencies,
or municipalities to embody the view that the public interest would be
served if a regulatory scheme displaced the forces of the free market.
The existence of a statute meeting this criterion ensures that the state
legislature at least conceived of the possibility that the authorized
regulation would have anticompetitive effects.
Read in isolation, the first prong of this test appears to contradict the
premise that antitrust immunities are disfavored because it interprets
intent to displace competition so liberally. For a private party’s conduct
to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny, however, it must also be actively
supervised by governmental officials in a manner sufficient to ensure
that the state’s view of the public interest—rather than the private
interests of the regulated parties—is served.73 “Actual state involvement,
not deference to private [anticompetitive] arrangements under the
general auspices of state law, is the precondition for [application of the
doctrine].”74 The active supervision requirement ensures that the challenged
“anticompetitive acts were truly the product of state regulation.”75
Under this view, antitrust rules limit only the ability of a private
regulation is quite similar to the rationale for an antitrust immunity from federal
regulation.”).
68. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
69. Id. at 351.
70. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57
(1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43–44 (1985); Cal. Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980).
71. See Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105.
72. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 61; Town of Hallie, 471
U.S. at 41–46.
73. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992); Patrick
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988).
74. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 633.
75. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100.

572

SEMERARO.DOC

1/14/2020 3:52 PM

[VOL. 40: 555, 2003]

The Antitrust-Telecom Connection
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

business to enter anticompetitive agreements or take actions that tend to
create or maintain a monopoly. Antitrust places these limits on private
conduct not because agreements and monopolies are inherently
undesirable in all contexts. Unrestrained competition also can have
negative public welfare effects.76 Antitrust doctrine holds only that the
forces of competition must prevail over the private decisions of
presumptively self-interested business persons because private actors
will be tempted to use collusion or monopoly power to serve their own
interests. But when a public-interested actor makes the decision to
displace free market forces, antitrust principles are not offended because
governmental actors may be trusted to choose anticompetitive solutions
only when they are in the public interest.
B. Court and Agency Analysis in the Telecom-Antitrust
Cases Rests on These Doctrines
The following Subsections show how the courts deciding the telecomantitrust cases have relied on these two doctrines.
1. The Second and Eleventh Circuits Rely on the
Implied Immunity Doctrine
In Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. and
Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., the lower courts
dismissed the antitrust claims on the ground that antitrust does not
require a firm, even a monopolist, to help its competitors.77 On appeal,
the courts correctly recognized that the Sherman Act sometimes does
impose positive duties on monopolists.78 Because the complaint alleged
all the elements of a section 2 case, it could not be dismissed unless the
1996 Act immunized Bell Atlantic from antitrust attack.
The Second and Eleventh Circuits—in keeping with the arguments in
76. Congress has implicitly recognized this by creating explicit antitrust
exemptions, silently acquiescing in judicially created exemptions, and granting broad
discretion to the courts to shape antitrust duties. Semeraro, supra note 66, at 236–39.
77. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 96 (2d
Cir. 2002); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2002).
78. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 108–09 (holding that allegations
amounting to violations of the 1996 Act state section 2 claims under the essential
facilities and monopoly leveraging doctrines); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth
Corp., 299 F.3d at 1284–87 (same).
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Antitrust Division and FCC amicus filings in other cases—followed the
conflict-centered dicta in the Supreme Court implied immunity cases
and held that the Telecom Act did not block antitrust scrutiny.79
Because the Telecom Act’s express purpose is to engender just the sort
of competition that the antitrust laws are designed to preserve, there is
obviously no conflict.80 The Second Circuit explained that such a
conclusion is “unambiguously” established by the Act’s antitrust savings
clause.81 Neither the courts nor the agencies consider the effect of
79. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109; see Covad Communications
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1280; see also Brief of Amici Curiae United States
and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 10, Covad
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (No. 01-16064-C); Brief for the
United States and Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellants at 8, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. (11th
Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ).
80. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109; Covad Communications Co.
v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1281–82 (supporting conclusion with references to
legislative history and presidential and FCC statements); Brief of Amici Curiae United
States and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 14–15, Covad
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (No. 01-16064-C) (contrasting
the Telecom Act with a statute that empowers “a regulatory agency . . . to approve, in
furtherance of other regulatory goals, anticompetitive conduct that would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws”); Brief for the United States and Federal Communications
Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 10–12, Intermedia
Communications (No. 01-10224-JJ).
81. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109. The 1996 Act actually
contains two savings clauses: (1) “nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this
Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the
antitrust laws,” Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601, Stat. 143 (1996); and (2) “This Act and the
amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede
Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.”
47 U.S.C. § 152(c)(1) (2000). The legislative history of the Act also supports this
understanding by recognizing as an “underlying theme” of the Act that the FCC “should
be carrying out the policies of the Communications Act, and the DOJ should be carrying
out the policies of the antitrust laws.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996). The
House Conference Report also confirmed that the Act’s savings clauses “[prevent]
affected parties from asserting that the [Act] impliedly preempts other laws.” Id.
While generally in accord with the Second Circuit’s decision in Trinko, amicus briefs
filed by the enforcement agencies rely more heavily on the antitrust savings clause to
support their position that full antitrust analysis is required. Brief of Amici Curiae
United States and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 10,
Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (No. 01-16064-C)
(explaining that the savings clause meant that “conduct that would have violated the
Sherman Act before passage of the 1996 Act is still prohibited by the Sherman Act,
whether or not it also violates the 1996 Act”); Brief for the United States v. Federal
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 8, Intermedia
Communications (No. 01-10224-JJ) (same). But as Judge Martin explained in her
opinion dismissing Covad’s case against Bell Atlantic, the clause merely preserves
existing antitrust doctrine. If the scope of antitrust does not reach regulated conduct
highly supervised by governmental actors, and the 1996 Act meets that definition, then
violations of the Act’s provisions would not constitute antitrust violations despite the
savings clause. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131
(D.D.C. 2002) (“Congress made explicit its intention that the 1996 Act should not in any
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government oversight. Instead, the courts declared that the relationship
between the plaintiffs’ allegations and the Telecom Act was simply
irrelevant to antitrust analysis.82 “If there is no . . . implicit immunity,”
the Second Circuit explained, “as long as a set of allegations states an
antitrust action on its own terms, the fact that it closely resembles an
action brought under another statute in itself is unproblematic.”83
2. The Seventh Circuit and Most Lower Courts Implicitly
Rely on Government Oversight
The following Subsections analyze the much more confusing analysis
in Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.84 and the cases that follow it. These
courts explicitly reject any reliance on the implied immunity doctrine.
They instead hold that a violation of a duty imposed by the 1996 Act
cannot be anticompetitive within the meaning of the Sherman Act.85
The final Subsections consider two explanations for this result: (1) that
antitrust does not impose positive duties to assist potential competitors,
and (2) that conduct actively supervised by governmental actors falls
outside the scope of antitrust scrutiny. They conclude that the latter
analysis provides the best rationale for the results in these cases. As
explained in Part IV, however, existing antitrust-regulatory accommodation
doctrine is inadequate where the regulation seeks to enhance competition.

way alter the application or scope of existing antitrust law.”); cf. Square D Co. v.
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 418, 419 & n.23, 420 & n.27 (1986)
(recognizing that the antitrust savings clause in the Reed-Bulwinkle Act and the Motor
Carrier Act preserved antitrust limitations of the filed rate doctrine).
82. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109 (holding that “there is no
requirement that an allegation that otherwise states an antitrust claim must not rely on
allegations that might also state a claim under another statute”); see also id. at 111
(holding that “controlling case law does not support the theory that specific legislation
meant to encourage competition necessarily takes precedence over the general antitrust
laws.”); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1282 (“[W]e cannot
agree with Goldwasser to the extent that it is read to say that a Sherman Act antitrust
claim cannot be brought as a matter of law on the basis of an allegation of anti-competitive
conduct that happens to be ‘intertwined’ with obligations established by the 1996 Act.”).
83. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109; see also Covad Communications
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1282–83.
84. 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000), aff’g on other grounds, No. 97-C-6788, 1998
WL 60878 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1998).
85. See infra Part III.B.2.a.

575

SEMERARO.DOC

1/14/2020 3:52 PM

a. The Goldwasser Decision and Its Progeny
In Goldwasser, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of an antitrust
claim by local telephone service customers against Ameritech.86 On its
face, the complaint alleged the elements necessary to prove that
Ameritech violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.87 Local telephone
service undoubtedly forms a relevant antitrust market, and Ameritech
certainly had monopoly power in that market by virtue of its
overwhelming market share and the high barriers to entry into local
telephone service. The only real question was whether the alleged
conduct constituted anticompetitive predatory conduct or procompetitive
conduct justified by a legitimate business justification.
The court never engaged in the analysis necessary to answer that
question.88 Judge Wood’s opinion did not evaluate whether the conduct
substantially contributed to maintaining Ameritech’s dominant position,
86. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 392, 402.
87. In a monopolization case, the court must define the relevant market, determine
whether the defendant has monopoly power in that market, and if so, evaluate whether
the challenged conduct is predatory or exclusionary—whether its effect was to exclude
or limit competition in a way that did not benefit consumers. For an exemplary recent
example of this antitrust analysis, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
50–78 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In Goldwasser, no one disputed that Ameritech had market
power in local telephone service, and the complaint alleged that its conduct violating the
Act was predatory, i.e. without a procompetitive purpose and beneficial to the actor only
to the extent that it lessened competition on the merits.
88. Some courts have added, in dicta, that antitrust remedies would threaten the
elaborate structure of negotiations and regulatory approval created by the 1996 Act. As
the Seventh Circuit explained in Goldwasser: “[T]he procedures established under the
1996 Act for achieving competitive markets are [not] compatible with the procedures
that would be used to accomplish the same result under the antitrust laws.” Goldwasser,
222 F.3d at 401. “The elaborate system of negotiated agreements and enforcement
established by the 1996 Act could be brushed aside by any unsatisfied party with the
simple act of filing an antitrust action.” Id.; see also Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys.,
Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 99-1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23816, at *12 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001) (same); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 133 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting a “fundamental incompatibility
between the remedial schemes established by the antitrust laws and the 1996 Act”).
The agencies’ amicus filings explain why the remedy concern is overstated. “[A]ny
antitrust relief,” they point out, “should take account of regulatory policy and decisions
in regulatory proceedings . . . . The need to harmonize enforcement of complementary
federal statutes, however, is not a proper basis for dismissing a complaint—especially
one seeking only damages—at the pleading state.” Brief of Amici Curiae United States
and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 15, Covad
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064C). In another amicus brief, the Department agreed “that courts should attempt to avoid
conflict with regulatory policy in fashioning antitrust injunctions. The speculative
possibility that an injunction could ultimately be entered in this case, however, scarcely
justifies dismissing a complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief at the pleadings
stage.” Brief for the United States and Federal Communications Commission as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellants at 19, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. (11th Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ).

576

SEMERARO.DOC

[VOL. 40: 555, 2003]

1/14/2020 3:52 PM

The Antitrust-Telecom Connection
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

nor did it look to whether the company had legitimate business reasons
for its conduct. That failure would have been understandable if the court
had held that the 1996 Act immunized Ameritech from antitrust liability.
But the court forswore any reliance on the implied immunity doctrine.89
Instead, the court declared, without market-specific analysis, that
violations of a regulatory statute are not predatory acts under the antitrust
laws.90 The court concluded that duties imposed by the 1996 Act “are
precisely the kinds of affirmative duties to help one’s competitors
that . . . do not exist under the unadorned antitrust laws.”91 Because
those duties “go well beyond anything the antitrust laws would mandate
on their own,” the complaint amounted to an attack on a monopolist for
failing to help its competitors and thereby lower prices for consumers.92
Because “the antitrust laws do not impose that kind of affirmative duty,
even on monopolists,” the complaint failed to state a claim.93
The plaintiffs countered, and the court did not dispute, that the antitrust
laws sometimes do impose positive duties on monopolists to cooperate with
competitors. But because all of the allegations were “inextricably linked to
the claims under the 1996 Act,”94 the court held that the more specific
provisions of the 1996 Act “must take precedence.”95
Despite its broad language, Goldwasser could be read to establish no
more than a rule of careful pleading—that merely alleging a violation of
a regulatory statute does not suffice to state an antitrust claim. Instead, a
plaintiff must allege with more particularity how such a violation
affected competition in the relevant market.96 In most telecom-antitrust
89. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401 (“Our principal holding is thus not that the 1996 Act
confers implied immunity on behavior that would otherwise violate the antitrust law[s].”).
90. See id. at 399–400.
91. Id. at 400.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 401.
95. Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 18, Covad Communications Co. v.
BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C).
The meaning of this passage is unclear, particularly in view of the Seventh
Circuit’s express disclaimer of any holding “that the 1996 Act confers implied
immunity on behavior that would otherwise violate the antitrust law,” and its
acknowledgment that “[s]uch a conclusion would be troublesome at best given
the antitrust savings clause in the statute.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401).
96. Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust
Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2003).

577

SEMERARO.DOC

1/14/2020 3:52 PM

cases following Goldwasser, however, the district courts have interpreted
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion broadly to preclude any antitrust claim
relating to a violation of the 1996 Act irrespective of the specificity of
the pleading.97 For example, Judge Seitz, in Supra Telecommunications
& Information Systems, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,
declared that claims of this sort “extend far beyond the purview of [the]
antitrust laws which generally do not require a monopolist to ‘cooperate
with competitors.’”98 Similarly, in Covad’s case against Bell Atlantic,
Judge Kessler wrote that the Act “was designed by Congress to spur
competition in local telephone markets in ways that the antitrust laws did
not require.”99 As a result, an ILEC’s “failure to comply with [the duties
imposed by the 1996 Act] . . . does not constitute ‘exclusionary’ conduct
as a matter of law.”100 Following this reasoning, these courts have
dismissed all claims bearing any connection to the 1996 Act without
evaluating the conduct under the “rule of reason.”101
97. For example, in Cavalier, the plaintiff took great care to allege its antitrust
claims in the traditional way without reference to the 1996 Act. Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v.
Verizon Va. Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12 (E.D. Va. 2002). In dismissing the
claims, the court rejected the notion that Goldwasser could be limited to a pleading
requirement. Id. at 613 (“That Cavalier’s Complaint did not characterize its allegations
as violations of the 1996 Act is beside the point. Such a shallow interpretation of the
relationship between the 1996 Act and antitrust law would relegate the matter to a
mindless word game played out at the pleading stage . . . .”).
98. Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 991706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816, at *11 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001). “No
court has yet held that antitrust laws now include the affirmative duties created by the
TCA and this Court shall decline to do so as well.” Id. at *14; see also Cavalier Tel.,
208 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (explaining that the “specific obligations” imposed by the 1996
Act “extend far beyond the general admonitions against monopolization and anticompetitive behavior expressed by federal antitrust law”); Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002).
The affirmative duties imposed by the Telecommunications Act are not
coterminous with the duty of a monopolist to refrain from exclusionary
practices. Moreover, the mere fact that a monopolist has violated another
statute does not transform such offense into a violation of the antitrust laws.
Thus, plaintiff has failed to allege any “willful acquisition or maintenance” of
monopoly power by Bell Atlantic.
Id. (citations omitted); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., No.
00-CIV-1910, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2001) (“Because [plaintiffs have] failed to
allege any anticompetitive conduct on the part of Bell Atlantic, its Sherman Act claim
must be dismissed.”)), rev’d, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002); MGC Communications, Inc. v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1351–52 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (quoting
extensively from Goldwasser and applying its reasoning).
99. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130
(D.D.C. 2002).
100. Id.
101. For example, courts have dismissed claims that “raise[d] a duty or obligation
created and imposed by the 1996 Act,” were “intertwined with,” “related to,” “included
under,” “implicated by,” “‘inextricably linked’ to,” or “essentially a reincarnation of” a
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b. Interpreting Goldwasser and Its Progeny
This Subsection considers two possible explanations for the results in
the Goldwasser line of cases: (1) that violations of the positive duties
under the Act could not be anticompetitive in any context, and (2) that
active government oversight renders conduct within the market regulated
by the 1996 Act beyond the scope of the antitrust laws. This Subsection
concludes that while the first explanation is unsupportable, the second
provides the best, though still inadequate, justification for the holdings.
i. The Fully Contextual Nature of Antitrust Analysis
Opinions in the telecom-antitrust cases appear to hold that conduct
violating the antitrust laws has certain metes and bounds irrespective of
competitive conditions. These lines of demarcation separate collusive
conduct and unilateral acts that hinder a competitor’s ability to compete
from cooperative behavior that assists competitors. The 1996 Act’s
positive duties to cooperate, the courts seem to believe, fall outside the
purview of the antitrust laws in every imaginable context.102
Goldwasser surely relied, at least in part, on this line of reasoning.
The court emphasized that even monopolists must have sufficient
breathing room to compete, and that “[p]art of competing like everyone
else is the ability to make decisions about with whom and on what terms
one will deal.”103 As a result, “even a firm with significant market
duty created by the 1996 Act. Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 11, Covad Communications Co. v.
BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C) (quoting various
formulations used in Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.); see also Bldg.
Communications, Inc. v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., No. 97-CV-76336, slip op. at 20–24
(E.D. Mich. June 21, 2001); Cavalier Tel., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 615 n.3, 616–17
(dismissing the claim based on an “allegation that Verizon employees contacted
Cavalier’s existing and potential customers in an attempt to draw business away from
Cavalier,” an allegation that the court admitted “does not concern a duty imposed by the
1996 Act”).
102. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 131
(“[T]here is nearly unanimous consensus that the 1996 Act imposes affirmative duties of
assistance that require far more than the existing antitrust laws now require.”); cf. USM
Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (“There is a difference
between positive and negative duties, and the antitrust laws, like other legal doctrines
sounding in tort, have generally been understood to impose only the latter.”). For cases
describing the minimum criteria for antitrust liability see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986).
103. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 2000).
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power” has the freedom to deal with customers and partners of its own
choosing, unless its “decisions are part of a broader effort to maintain its
monopoly power.”104
Many of the lower courts simply follow Goldwasser. But Judge
Kessler’s opinion in Covad’s case against Bell Atlantic expanded on
Judge Wood’s analysis. She wrote that “conduct that was proscribed
prior to the 1996 Act remains proscribed after its enactment. Similarly,
conduct that did not violate antitrust law prior to the 1996 Act does not
now violate antitrust law after the Act.”105 This language could be
interpreted in two ways. Judge Kessler could be making a contextual
claim that given the competitive conditions in the local telephone
market, the challenged acts do not cause competitive concern
irrespective of the 1996 Act. But such a claim would require careful
economic analysis not found in the opinion. Judge Kessler does cite the
“nearly unanimous consensus that the 1996 Act imposes affirmative
duties of assistance that require far more than the existing antitrust laws
now require.”106 But none of the cited cases engaged in the market
specific analysis needed to support that holding.
The utter absence of antitrust analysis suggests a second interpretation
of Judge Kessler’s language, namely that some conduct, particularly
conduct involving a refusal to cooperate with a potential competitor,
may never rise to the level of an antitrust violation. But such a
noncontextual reading of the antitrust laws conflicts with a longstanding
tradition of imposing positive obligations in certain limited contexts
where defendants have monopoly power. The traditional starting points
are United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, where the U.S.
Supreme Court ordered access on fair and equal terms to a jointly-owned
bridge across the Mississippi,107 and Associated Press v. United States,
where the Court required that a cooperative newsgathering agency be
opened to the competitors of its existing members.108 In Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, the Court compelled a newspaper to accept
advertising from firms that also advertised with a competing radio
station.109 In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Court
required a ski mountain operator to cooperate with a competitor by selling

104. Id. at 398.
105. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 131. Judge
Kessler further explained that Covad’s “allegations focus on disputes over the terms for
obtaining access to Bell Atlantic’s local exchange network—an entitlement that was first
created by the 1996 Act (not by the antitrust laws).” Id. at 132.
106. Id. at 131.
107. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 411–12 (1912).
108. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
109. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1951).
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tickets that allowed skiers to choose to ski on any mountain.110 And the
Microsoft case will certainly yield cooperative remedies, most likely in the
form of a duty to disclose information about updates in Windows, to allow
competitive software providers to update their own products.111
These cases demonstrate that antitrust doctrine is contextual. That is,
whether particular conduct violates the law depends on the competitive
conditions within which the conduct is taken.112 Those telecom-antitrust
courts that do not ignore this line of authority distinguish it on the
ground that the defendants in those cases were not subjected to a
regulatory program with as much structure as the program created by the
Telecom Act.113 They recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a
positive duty on a highly regulated electric utility in Otter Tail Power Co.

110. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 598–99 (1985).
111. Revised Proposed Final Judgment in United States v. Microsoft (D.D.C. Nov.
2, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9500/9505.htm.
112. For example, an exclusive dealing arrangement between a new manufacturer
and a distributor in a market in which many manufacturers and distributors compete is
virtually certain to be a procompetitive way for the new manufacturer to enter the
market. Conversely, exclusive dealing arrangements between a dominant manufacturer
and the only three effective existing distributors of a particular product causes
competitive concern if the smaller competing manufacturers do not have meaningful
alternatives for distributing their products.
Antitrust doctrine does include certain per se rules that purport to prohibit particular
types of behavior. But even these rules apply contextually. And the courts have been
extremely reluctant to adopt rules of per se legality. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229–30 (1993) (rejecting a rule of per se
legality for primary-line price discrimination claims where recoupment is premised on
oligopoly pricing); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986)
(rejecting a rule of per se legality for predatory pricing claims arising from a merger).
Per se rules against tying and group boycotts explicitly require contextual analysis in the
rule itself. See N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 293–98 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–16 (1984). And
even the rules against price fixing, market division, and customer allocation, which are
typically stated more matter-of-factly, require some contextual analysis. See Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26
(1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979).
113. See Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v. Verizon Va. Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616 n.4
(E.D. Va. 2002) (distinguishing Aspen Skiing on the ground that “Cavalier’s allegations
concern the manner in which Verizon is meeting its responsibilities under the 1996
Act”); see also Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 399–400 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that Congress could have imposed “passive restrictions on the ILECs, under
which they would have been permitted to compete, but they would have been prohibited
from engaging in affirmatively exclusionary acts like the efforts of the Ski Company in
Aspen Skiing, or the newspaper company in Lorain Journal,” but instead Congress chose
a more intrusive regulatory approach).
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v. United States,114 and the MFJ dismantled AT&T’s regulated monopoly
over telephone service. But Judge Kessler maintains that those cases did
not involve regulation as pervasive as that imposed by the 1996 Act over
the very acts that are alleged to give rise to antitrust liability.115
This reasoning goes too far. To be sure, regulation necessarily affects
antitrust analysis to the extent that it alters the competitive conditions in
the market.116 For example, in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.,
then-Judge Breyer explained that a price squeeze is much less likely to
have anticompetitive effects in a market with full price regulation than in
an unregulated market.117 That conclusion is correct in part because
recognizing an antitrust price-squeeze claim in a regulated market would
create a perverse incentive for a regulated entity to increase its price at
both the wholesale and retail levels whenever it needed to raise price at
one level.118 Where economic analysis reveals such an anticompetitive
114. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1973) (requiring
a regulated, natural monopoly provider of electric power transmission to cooperate with
a competitor at the distribution level).
115. The Federal Power Commission did not have the authority to order the
wheeling sought in Otter Tail Power and, while the FCC did have the power to order the
interconnection sought in the MCI and government cases brought against AT&T, the
initial interconnection decision rested with the utility and “the FCC [had not] supervised
AT&T’s interconnection practices so closely.” Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 133 & n.21 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting MCI Communications
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1103 (7th Cir. 1983)).
116. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)
(explaining that “where regulatory and antitrust regimes coexist, . . . antitrust analysis
must sensitively ‘recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting’ of the
regulated industry to which it applies”) (citations omitted) (quoting Keith S. Watson &
Thomas W. Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated “Monopolies”: The Search for
Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 565 (1977)); MCI Communications
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1106 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that “the
presence of a substantial degree of regulation, although not sufficient to confer antitrust
immunity, may affect both the shape of ‘monopoly power’ and the precise dimensions of
the ‘willful acquisition or maintenance’ of that power” (quoting Keith S. Watson &
Thomas W. Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated “Monopolies”: The Search for
Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 563 (1977))); id. at 1109–10 (explaining
that a regulated firm should be able to defend against a predatory act charge by showing
that it acted in the good faith belief that its actions were required by applicable regulation);
Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
a defendant’s “reasonable basis to conclude that its actions were necessitated by concrete
factual imperatives recognized as legitimate by the regulatory authority” prevents
antitrust liability); IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 240c3 (explaining that
“antitrust courts can and do consider the particular circumstances of an industry and
therefore adjust their usual rules to the existence, extent, and nature of regulation”).
117. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 29. A price squeeze occurs when a producer
that also competes at a downstream level leaves too little spread between its wholesale
and retail price, threatening to drive downstream firms from the market. See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1945).
118. Similarly, a regulated firm would be reluctant to reduce price at one level
unless it was prepared to reduce its prices at both. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 27.
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effect from recognizing a particular antitrust claim, a court should
ordinarily dismiss the claim.119
Nothing approaching that sort of analysis can be found in any of the
telecom-antitrust cases. They instead rely on the unsupportable assertion
that a pervasively regulated firm simply cannot harm competition. As
Judge Kessler put it, an ILEC “has no freedom to take any unilateral
action relating to access to interconnection with the local networks.”120
Of course, AT&T made essentially the same argument in the early
1980s.121 It was rejected then because Judge Greene recognized that no
matter how extensive regulation might be, it can never pervasively
dictate a firm’s behavior.122 There will always be space within the
regulatory rules for a business entity to make significant competitive
decisions that are not dictated by regulators. Indeed, business entities
quickly learn to play the regulatory rules to minimize their procompetitive
impact.123 In the telecom-antitrust cases, the ILECs are charged with
119. For example, in Town of Concord, then-Judge Breyer was careful to limit the
scope of his holding to circumstances where the court’s analysis applied most strongly.
He explained that the court:
limited [its] holding by stating that “normally” a price squeeze will not
constitute an exclusionary practice in the context of a fully regulated
monopoly, thereby leaving cases involving exceptional circumstances for
another day. And we have stressed that our reasoning applies with full force
only when the monopolist who engages in the squeeze is regulated at both
industry levels.
Id. at 29.
120. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
121. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1357–58 (D.D.C.
1981).
122. Id. For this reason, antitrust law has always had “a substantial role in regulated
industries.” IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 241c.
123. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 27–28, 40–42
(1987) (explaining how entities subject to a set of rules learn to “walk the line” along
rules to serve their own interests); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
32–33 (1991) (stating that “[f]actual predicates will therefore in some cases turn on
features of the case that do not serve the rule’s justification, and in others fail to
recognize features of the case whose recognition would serve the rule’s justification”).
Further, “[t]hese errors are not a function of mistakes that decision-makers may make,
but instead are generated by decision-makers faithfully and accurately following the
rules.” Id. at 49. “This under- and over-inclusiveness . . . is largely ineliminable, the
product of entrenchment and not simply of how specific or how general a rule happens to
be.” Id. at 50. “But rules achieve clarity, certainty, and determinateness, at the price of
including either more or fewer cases in the legal categories defined by the rules than the
rationale underlying the rule calls for.” Id. at 50 n.14 (quoting GERALD J. POSTEMA,
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 447 (1986)).
Congress surely foresaw that problem in the local telephone service market and
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doing exactly that: delaying, discriminating, and engaging in other
anticompetitive conduct that has not been prevented by—and certainly
was not required by—the regulatory scheme.124
ii. Regulation and Government Supervision
Although the results in Goldwasser and its progeny would be
inexplicable in an unregulated market, the opinions in those cases
emphasize the importance of regulation. From the perspective of the
implied immunity doctrine, as traditionally understood, these references
to regulation appear to be irrelevant. There is simply no conflict
between the statutes. But if one views the opinions through the prism of
the antitrust state action doctrine, a more coherent approach emerges. In
Goldwasser, Judge Wood explained that competitors should rely on the
“elaborate enforcement structure that Congress created [in the 1996 Act]
for purposes of managing the transition from the former regulated world
to the hoped-for competitive markets of the future.”125 Perhaps if those
mechanisms were wholly ineffectual, antitrust might have some role to
play. Because “[q]uestions concerning the duties of the ILECs, the state
commissions, and competitors have been coming before the courts with
regularity,” she concluded, “[t]he antitrust laws would add nothing to the
oversight already available under the 1996 law.”126
Judge Kessler’s opinion in Covad v. Bell Atlantic also emphasized that
private conduct cannot be anticompetitive if it is actively supervised by
public-minded government regulators. In rejecting Covad’s argument
that Bell Atlantic had denied it access to an essential facility, Judge
Kessler maintained that:
there can be no significant harm to competition or anti-competitive effect as a
matter of antitrust law, as every relevant facet of Bell Atlantic’s relationship
with Covad is subject to regulation under the 1996 Act, the rules of the FCC,
and the affirmative and active supervision of state public utility commissions
charged with the 1996 Act’s enforcement.127

responded by requiring negotiated agreements between competitors rather than
proscribing the specific terms on which they had to deal. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress sought to
allow ILECs and their competitors to govern their interconnection relationships directly
through specific interconnection agreements rather than the broadly outlined duties
described in [section 251].”).
124. As the Second Circuit explained: “While ideally, the regulatory process alone
would be enough to bring competition to the local phone service markets, it is possible
that the antitrust laws will be needed to supplement the regulatory scheme . . . .” Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 112 (footnote omitted).
125. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000).
126. Id. at 400–01.
127. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132
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This is not an argument about conflicting statutory schemes. It is an
assertion of substantive antitrust law—that antitrust law does not
function where regulation rather than marketplace forces govern
competitive interaction among firms. This assertion is the antitrust state
action doctrine: private conduct falls outside the scope of antitrust
scrutiny because it is the product of public, rather than private, decision.
By finding that the challenged conduct falls outside the scope of
antitrust law, these decisions avoid running afoul of the Telecom Act’s
antitrust savings clause. As Judge Kessler explained, the savings clause
merely preserves existing antitrust doctrine.128 But existing doctrine
includes doctrine that defines limitations on the scope of antitrust.
Conduct that violated the antitrust laws before the enactment of the 1996
Act—private business conduct—would continue to violate the antitrust
laws. But conduct subject to active oversight by state actors, which did
not violate the antitrust laws before the 1996 Act, could not become an
antitrust violation as a result of the Act.
A likely objection to this interpretation of the Goldwasser line of cases
is that antitrust state action applies only to state regulation, and the
Telecom Act is obviously federal law. As described above, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court has looked to supervision by governmental actors
regardless of the source of the regulation. And, in similar cases
involving joint federal-state regulation of electric and gas utilities, the
courts have had no difficulty applying antitrust state action doctrine.
For example, electric utilities, like telephone companies, have long been
subjected to a dual system of regulation. In 1978, Congress passed the
Public Utility Regulatory Practices Act (PURPA),129 defining a class of
small scale electric power generators that could reduce the monopoly local
electricity providers’ reliance on fossil fuel.130 Congress recognized two
barriers to this sort of entry into electric power generation that were
remarkably similar to the difficulties faced in the local telephone service
market. First, existing regulatory structures made market entry cumbersome
and expensive.131 Second, the utilities had no incentive to agree to provide
(D.D.C. 2002) (“Bell Atlantic has no freedom to take any unilateral action relating to
access to interconnection with the local networks.”).
128. See id. at 130–31.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1994).
130. Id. § 796(17)(A)–(18)(B).
131. TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.5
(11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that PURPA “relax[ed] restrictions on entry into the (former
monopolist’s) service area”).
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backup power to, or to buy excess power from, new entrants because they
would likely steal the utilities’ largest customers.
In the electric power industry, Congress sought to overcome these
obstacles in much the same way that it later would in the Telecom Act. It
placed positive duties on the electric utilities to interconnect with the new
generators for the purpose of buying and selling power,132 directing the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to issue rules and regulations, and
also directing state public utility commissions to implement those rules.133
Not surprisingly, electric utilities did not respond as cooperatively as
the new generators would have liked. Inevitably, failed projects led to a
bevy of antitrust suits that amounted to a prequel to the antitrust
litigation that has followed the 1996 Act.134 Unlike the ILECs, electric
132. The legislative history of PURPA recognized:
that two problems impeded the development of nontraditional generating
facilities: (1) traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power
from, and to sell power to, the nontraditional facilities, and (2) the regulation
of these alternative energy sources by state and federal utility authorities
imposed financial burdens upon the nontraditional facilities and thus
discouraged their development.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750–51 (1982) (footnotes
omitted); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (directing FERC to prescribe implementing rules).
133. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)–(f); Conn. Light and Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. 61,012
(1995). State utility commissions were granted “latitude in determining the manner in
which the regulations are to be implemented. Thus, a state commission may comply
with the statutory requirements by issuing regulations, by resolving disputes on a caseby-case basis, or by taking any other action reasonably designed to give effect to
FERC’s rules.” Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 751.
Should a state commission fail to implement FERC’s rules, however, PURPA authorizes
FERC to enforce the statute’s requirements in federal court. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h).
134. Representative claims included allegations that utilities:
(1) Refused to buy power on the terms required by an interconnection agreement. See
TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1567 (alleging that the utility “paid cogenerators too
little for their excess power”); Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light
Co., 113 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 1997) (alleging that utility disingenuously invoked
system emergency exception to power purchase contract in order to avoid
purchases); Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., No. 97-CV10366-BC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 1999) (alleging
a utility’s refusal “to enter into a power purchase agreement, and [to provide]
meaningful access to interconnect to [the utility’s] transmission systems”); Destec
Energy, Inc. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (alleging that
utility refused to enter power purchase contract without “transport-or-pay” provision).
(2) Cut their own rates to particular customers to dissuade such customers from
building competitive power generators. See TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1567
(alleging that the utility “offered lower rates to customers considering
cogeneration”); Indeck Energy Servs, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *5–6 (alleging
that the utility offered lower rates conditioned on exclusive dealing with the utility);
United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 173 (W.D.N.Y.
1998) (alleging that the utility entered “a contract with the University of
Rochester . . . whereby [the utility] promised to provide electricity . . . at reduced
rates in return for, inter alia, the University’s promise not to compete”).
(3) Adopted other practices designed to discourage competition. See TEC Cogeneration,
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utilities focused squarely on the antitrust state action doctrine.135 And
while they met with mixed success, no court held the doctrine
inapplicable because PURPA was a federal statute.136
IV. SIX DEGREES OF CONNECTION BETWEEN COMPETITIONENHANCING, INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC REGULATORY
STATUTES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The courts have reached divergent results in the telecom-antitrust
cases because they have effectively employed two different modes of
legal analysis. This Part explains the courts’ confusion about which
doctrine to apply in the telecom-antitrust cases by showing that neither
doctrine is adequate. Instead of the “yes or no” approach to antitrust
enforcement that is appropriate where regulation serves other public
policy goals, a more nuanced analysis is required when Congress itself
makes competition policy. A court must first consider how antitrust
enforcement would impact the implementation of the competitionenhancing regulatory program. Then, if antitrust would not interfere, a
court must proceed to consider how the existence of regulatory duties
should affect antitrust analysis. In answering these questions, a court
will be called upon to choose one of six degrees of connection between
antitrust law and a competition-enhancing, industry-specific regulation.

76 F.3d at 1567 (alleging that the utility “proposed higher rates for backup power sold
to cogenerators” and interfered with interconnection by imposing “unreasonable terms
in the interconnection agreement”); Indeck Energy Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7251, at *6 (alleging the utility’s refusal “to negotiate in good faith a standby power
agreement”); Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture v. N. States Power Co., No. 490-279, 1991 WL 13729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 1991) (alleging that the utility
prevented competitive facility from being constructed by “withdr[awing] its support
from the project . . . and . . . obtruct[ing] plaintiffs’ access to municipal solid waste
which was a possible fuel source for the facility”).
135. See TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1567–70 (refusing to scrutinize utility conduct
under antitrust laws); Indeck Energy Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *7–11;
Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 175; Destec Energy, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 444–
58; Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1504, at *10–12.
136. For cases rejecting the antitrust state action defense see Rochester Gas and
Electric Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 175–76; Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1504, at *10–12.
For cases upholding the antitrust state action defense see TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d
at 1570; Indeck Energy Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *20–21; N. Star Steel
Tex., Inc. v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565–67 (S.D. Tex. 1998);
Destec Energy, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
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A. Distinguishing Existing Doctrine
Whenever courts consider a conflict between antitrust and another
regulatory scheme, their task is to accommodate both laws in a way that
best advances the purposes of each. Existing doctrine was developed to
address potential conflicts between antitrust and regulatory programs
that serve a public policy goal other than competition. For example,
PURPA was enacted to lessen reliance on fossil fuel, a public policy
goal not necessarily consistent with enhancing competition. In that
context, both antitrust law and industry-specific regulation may coexist
without compromising the goals of either. As a result, implied
immunities are appropriately disfavored. The laws’ purposes are best
served if both apply fully.
Where governmental actors actively supervise business conduct with a
noncompetition-enhancing regulatory program, courts refuse to scrutinize
the conduct under the antitrust laws. Often, competitive policy can
coexist with the alternative public policy goal. But regulators are
considered to be more capable of balancing competing goals than the
courts. In these cases, the antitrust state action doctrine assumes that the
legislature incorporated into its regulatory framework whatever
consideration of competitive policy it deemed appropriate and assigned
that task to regulators. So long as the governmental oversight is
sufficiently active, court enforced antitrust duties would interfere or
conflict with the agency enforced regulatory duties. Indeed, this is the
sort of conflict that the U.S. Supreme Court likely had in mind in the
implied immunity cases.
In theory, courts could also balance competition and other public policy
goals. In practice, however, courts limit their inquiries to competition-based
arguments.137 Regulators are better situated to take account of noncompetition
goals and balance them against competitive considerations. Where
regulators have no duty to consider competition on an ongoing basis,
however, their level of supervision may not be sufficiently active to
remove the conduct from the scope of antitrust, and the courts will
scrutinize the conduct under the antitrust laws as if the regulation did not
exist.138 The Court’s decisions in the securities regulation cases provide
137. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690–92
(1978). “[T]he statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question [of] whether
competition is good or bad.” Id. at 695.
138. In some cases, the Court has applied the antitrust laws despite the legislature’s
vesting authority in a regulatory body to consider competitive factors. In these cases, the
Court appears to have been concerned that Congress did not grant the regulatory body
sufficient authority to actively supervise the conduct in question. For example, in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court stressed that authority to take
competition into account in reviewing a merger was insufficient to supplant the antitrust
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examples. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, there was no active
governmental supervision of the challenged conduct, and the Court held
antitrust scrutiny to be appropriate.139 In Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., the Court trusted government regulators to balance the
goals of securities regulation and antitrust.140 It was not that competition
did not have a role to play in the securities industry. It simply had to be
applied with due regard for other goals. While “the sole aim of antitrust
legislation is to protect competition,” the Court explained, “the SEC
must consider, in addition, the economic health of the investors, the
exchanges, and the securities industry.”141 Where competing public
policy goals exist and governmental actors supervise private
competitors, imposing the full panoply of antitrust duties would disrupt
the regulatory structure and potentially interfere with the pursuit of
either goal. As Justice Blackmun explained in Gordon:
Given the expertise of the SEC, the confidence the Congress has placed in the
agency, and the active roles the SEC and the Congress have taken, permitting
courts throughout the country to conduct their own antitrust proceedings would
conflict with the regulatory scheme authorized by Congress rather than
supplement that scheme.142

B. Developing Accommodation Doctrine for
Competition-Enhancing Regulation
Existing doctrine is inadequate to deal with competition-enhancing
regulation. On the one hand, it is not enough to ask whether there is a
conflict in policies. When regulation serves competitive ends, the goals
obviously do not conflict. But a regulatory program might nonetheless
be compromised by the duties imposed by the general antitrust laws. On
the other hand, when regulation serves competitive ends, a court cannot
laws where the reviewing agency did not have broad, continuing authority to supervise
competitive factors. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51 (1963)
(stressing the limited duty to consider competition in reviewing merger and absence of
continuing regulatory oversight of competitive factors); see California v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482, 486 (1962) (same).
139. See supra Part III.A.2.
140. Id.
141. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975).
142. Id. at 689–90; see United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S.
694, 735 (1975) (“[M]aintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly related to
the SEC’s responsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees would be subjected to
duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly a result that Congress would have
mandated.”).
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assume that even a highly supervised regulatory program should
displace antitrust enforcement. While regulators may well be better
positioned than courts to balance competition and noncompetition
oriented public policy goals, where the only goal is enhanced
competition, courts are at least equally capable.
In developing doctrine for competition-enhancing regulation, a court
must begin by recognizing that antitrust duties might interfere with
regulatory duties even where there is little direct governmental
oversight. Just because regulation and antitrust seek the same goal does
not mean that both can be consistently applied. But there is also no a
priori reason to assume that both statutes cannot be consistently applied.
All regulation is not of a piece. Inevitably, regulatory programs will
differ in the requirements imposed and the means of implementation. A
court must be sensitive to these differences and the effect that antitrust
may have on them.
Judge Wood’s Goldwasser opinion illustrates the challenge by ignoring
it. She concludes that it would be “illogical . . . to equate a failure to
comply with the 1996 Act with a failure to comply with the antitrust
laws.”143 Recognizing that “there are countless laws that a firm with
market power might violate that have little or nothing to do with its
position in the market,” she contended that a violation of a regulatory
duty cannot “support an antitrust claim.”144
While that is true with respect to regulatory statutes that in fact have
“little or nothing to do” with competition, when the purpose of industryspecific regulation is to enhance competition, a violation of that statute
has everything to do with the firm’s competitive position. There may be
reasons not to layer antitrust duties atop regulatory duties, but logic has
nothing to do with them. A court must look carefully at the requirements
imposed by the statute and the means used to implement it.
This inquiry should be approached in two stages. First, a court should
ask how imposing traditional antitrust duties on regulated firms would
affect the regulatory program. If antitrust enforcement would undermine
the ability of the regulators to spur the competition envisioned by the
legislature in enacting the industry-specific regulation, then courts should
not scrutinize conduct under the antitrust laws. Second, if antitrust
enforcement would not disrupt the regulatory program, then a court
should consider how the regulatory statute might affect antitrust analysis.
143. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000).
144. Id. (citing the following situations as examples: “an agricultural firm might fail
to comply with safety or cleanliness standards applicable to food processing; a computer
processor firm might violate employment discrimination laws; a pharmaceutical firm
might run afoul of the Food and Drug Administration’s rules for approval of new
drugs”).
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1. Whether Antitrust Enforcement Would Interfere with a
Procompetitive Regulatory Program
This Subsection clarifies the first step in the analysis by preempting
possible confusion about what is not involved. It then articulates a test
for determining whether antitrust enforcement can coexist with a
competition-enhancing regulatory program.
a. Focusing on How Imposing Antitrust Duties Would
Affect Regulatory Duties
In approaching the question of how antitrust enforcement might
undermine the procompetitive goals of an industry-specific statute, it is
important to focus on what is not at issue. First, the necessary inquiry is
much different from that undertaken with respect to the antitrust state
action doctrine. That doctrine focuses on legislative displacement of
competition and active supervision to ensure that the anticompetitive
conduct is in fact serving the noncompetitive regulatory goal. Where
regulation seeks to enhance competition, asking whether the legislature
sought to displace competition and whether regulators supervise
anticompetitive conduct are nonsensical questions. Instead, a court should
focus on whether the legislation, along with accompanying regulations,
channel competitive behavior such that antitrust enforcement might
prove disruptive.
Supervision will still be relevant, but in a different way. In prior
cases, the issue was whether governmental actors were driving the
policy decisions. If they were, then the conduct was deemed to be
outside the scope of antitrust.145 Where regulation seeks to enhance
competition, the level of supervision is not as important as the structure
of the regulation. Antitrust enforcement might serve positively to
augment even very actively supervised conduct, because both regulators
and courts would be advancing the same goal. Alternatively, antitrust
might disrupt a program with relatively little government supervision.
For example, a regulatory statute might require certain competitors to set
jointly a percentage mark-up over wholesale prices in order to spur
competition from resellers of the product in question. Allowing antitrust
attack on the joint conduct would undermine the regulation irrespective
of the level of government supervision over the prices set.
145.

See supra Part III.A.2.
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Second, the focus must be on substantive antitrust duties, not remedies.
Injunctive antitrust remedies could disrupt virtually any regulatory program
because, in theory, judges could order parties to alter anticompetitive
practices in ways that differ from the methods employed by the
regulation. Because judges have discretion in imposing injunctive relief,
however, they are also capable of tailoring that relief so as to minimize
disruption.146 The appropriate question is not whether antitrust remedies
could disrupt a regulatory program, but rather whether layering antitrust
duties on top of the regulatory duties would disrupt the program. Would
competitors in the industry be hindered in their ability to fulfill their
regulatory obligations if they were also required to meet the antitrust
standards of conduct ordinarily required of law abiding companies?
b. Rejecting Antitrust in Favor of Competition-Enhancing Regulation
Where antitrust would pervasively interfere with a regulatory program,
competitors in the industry should be free of antitrust duties. This complete
exemption could be appropriate in instances where the legislature sought to
structure the industry in a more orderly way than free competition would
allow. Competition can be chaotic. Long range planning in a competitive
market is uncertain. Where the legislature indicates that certainty is essential
to enable new competitors to enter the market, any antitrust enforcement
may interfere with the regulatory program.147 Alternatively, and more likely,
only certain regulatory duties will be compromised by antitrust enforcement.
In that case, only a competitor’s conduct that falls within those particular
regulatory duties would be exempted from the antitrust laws.
The first degree of antitrust-regulatory connection thus calls for no
connection at all. Regulation trumps antitrust entirely. The next Subsection
addresses the remaining five degrees in which antitrust continues to apply,
and the relevant question is what effect, if any, the regulatory statute has on
antitrust analysis.
146. See Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Communications
Commission as Amici Curiae at 15, Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299
F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C); Brief for the United States and Federal
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 12–13,
Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. (11th Cir. filed Jan. 12,
2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ). For an excellent discussion of the ways that courts should take
regulation into account in imposing antitrust remedies see Weiser, supra note 96.
147. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (“An
antitrust rule that seeks to promote competition but nonetheless interferes with regulatory
controls could undercut the very objectives the antitrust laws are designed to serve.”); IA
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 242b (explaining that “where the regulatory
regime controls such things as pricing, entry by new firms, joint market behavior,
mergers, or possible exclusionary practices by dominant firms, then an antitrust
immunity may be essential if regulatory goals are not to be frustrated”).
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2. How Regulation Affects Antitrust
If antitrust and the regulatory program can exist side by side without
interfering with regulatory duties, courts should go on to consider how
the regulatory program might affect antitrust analysis. Under existing
doctrine, if antitrust continues to apply, a court must generally apply it as
if the regulation did not exist. Since courts are poorly equipped to
balance public policy goals, the specifics of the regulation play no role
in their antitrust analysis. But the picture changes when the goal of the
regulation is to enhance consumer welfare.
Competition-enhancing regulation will assuredly involve explicit
legislative decisions about the type of conduct necessary to foster a
competitive environment in that industry. While there are situations
where those duties should appropriately be ignored in applying antitrust
law, in others the legislature’s regulatory decisions will be of critical
importance to courts in defining antitrust obligations.
Antitrust analysis is an inexact science, and that uncertainty
necessarily affects what courts do. There are often no objective facts to
which courts may turn to determine whether a particular practice
enhances competition, harms competition, or is competitively neutral.148
Because of its uncertainty, leading judges and commentators have
sought to put off or eliminate this inquiry altogether.149 The courts have
rejected that approach and have instead relied on burdens and
presumptions as a proxy for proof of actual anticompetitive effects. A
148. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that “the legality of a challenged
practice under the antitrust laws will often depend on a court’s judgment about the
degree of social harm that might result from the challenged practice, the social benefits
that might be obtained through that practice, and the availability of significantly less
restrictive alternatives.” IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 240c3.
149. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
[T]hough it is sometimes said that, in the case of restraints like these, it is
necessary to weigh procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects, we
do not think that a useable formula if it implies an ability to quantify the two
effects and compare the values found. . . . Weighing effects in any direct sense
will usually be beyond judicial capabilities but predictions about effects may
be reflected in rules about allowable size. . . . Antitrust adjudication has always
proceeded through inferences about market power drawn from market shares.
Id. at 229 n.11. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 17–39 (1984) (proposing filters to permit antitrust cases to be dismissed without
reaching the competitive harm question); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (proposing that low pricing campaigns be
treated as legal per se because of the difficulty of resolving the competitive harm question).
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plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant has a high market
share and that barriers to market entry exist. If a plaintiff overcomes that
burden, it encounters a second burden to prove that the defendant’s
specific conduct is predatory or exclusionary. This sort of conduct is
defined as actions or omissions “other than competition on the merits . . .
that reasonably [appear] capable of making a significant contribution to
creating or maintaining monopoly power.”150 Finally, if the defendant
responds with procompetitive justifications for the challenged conduct,
the plaintiff must show that the procompetitive benefits could be achieved
through less restrictive means or that, on balance, the defendant’s
conduct is anticompetitive.
In applying these burdens and presumptions, courts must wrestle with
the concern that procompetitive behavior will be discouraged if it is too
easy to maintain a plausible antitrust case.151 If the measure of cost in
predatory pricing cases were too high, for example, firms would be
discouraged from making procompetitive price cuts in order to guard
against antitrust litigation, if not liability. This concern leaves courts
150. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 21 (quoting 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 626 (1978)); see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (defining predatory or exclusionary conduct as
conduct that tends to “exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency” (quoting
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 138
(1978))); III PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 650a (1996) (“In order to
satisfy any conduct component of the monopolizing offense, the conduct in question
must be capable of making a significant contribution to the creation, maintenance, or
expansion of monopoly power.”).
151. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir.
1983) (explaining that “we must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a
search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging
legitimate price competition”); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (referring to the “intolerable risks of chilling
legitimate price cutting”); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
775 (1984) (explaining that “[s]ubjecting a single firm’s every action to judicial scrutiny
for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the
antitrust laws seek to promote”). In Goldwasser, the court explained that:
It is not enough that a single firm appears to “restrain trade” unreasonably, for
even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an
efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival,
whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the
marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the
consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster. In part because it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with longrun anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of
single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging
unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will
dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive competitor.
Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1984)).
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appropriately cautious about finding particularly unilateral conduct to be
predatory.
But this caution about section 2 cases is seriously undermined where
the legislature concludes that cooperation is a competitive necessity.
Walling off the area of prosecution dramatically reduces the concern
with false positive errors.152 Not all firms would need to worry, only
those in the regulated industry, and the legislature obviously wanted
those firms to worry about conduct of this sort.
The task for a court at this stage is to determine how much the
regulatory proscription should influence antitrust analysis by eliminating
one or more of the three burdens—market power, likely anticompetitive
effect, and rebuttal of procompetitive justifications—that are ordinarily
placed on an antitrust plaintiff.153 This Subsection describes five
additional degrees of connection between a regulatory statute and the
antitrust laws. The regulatory statute might:
(1) have no impact whatsoever on the application of the antitrust laws
to the industry,
(2) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute has
anticompetitive effects if the plaintiff proves that the defendant has
market power in a relevant market and the defendant has inadequate
procompetitive justifications for the act,
(3) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute has
anticompetitive effects even absent proof of market power if the
152. Cf. Steven Semeraro, Note, Distinguishing International from Domestic
Predation: A New Approach to Predatory Dumping, 23 STAN. J. INT’L L. 621, 640, 644–45
(1987) (demonstrating that aggressive enforcement of predatory pricing cases in the
international arena will not deter aggressive price competition generally because regulatory
antidumping mechanisms and the clear distinction between international and domestic
conduct effectively limits the firms exposed to antitrust liability).
153. That courts must temper antitrust analysis to account for noncompetition-enhancing
regulation is well accepted. IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 240c3 (explaining
that “the existence of a special regulatory statute may insulate the court from its usual
assumptions about industrial behavior and the social good and even render a per se rule
inapplicable”). The approach suggested here applies the same reasoning—that the flexible
antitrust laws must adapt to the specifics of an industry—to expand antitrust in light of
competition enhancing regulation. While less often discussed, this possibility is not entirely
new to the literature. Id. ¶ 240d.
[T]he presence of regulation in some instances limits the antitrust role, and in
some instances simply changes it or even enlarges it. The impact depends on
the nature of the regulatory regime, the nature of the antitrust claim, and the
degree of supervision given by the agency to the challenged conduct.
Id.
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defendant has inadequate procompetitive justifications for the act,
(4) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute is
per se illegal if the plaintiff proves that the defendant has market
power in a relevant market, or
(5) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute
should be treated as a per se antitrust violation regardless of proof
of market power or potential procompetitive justifications.
A court’s choice among these will turn on the regulatory methods used
and the findings underlying them. To pinpoint just how influential the
regulation should be, a court must consider the competitive conclusions
evinced by the legislation. A marketplace duty intended to enhance
competition necessarily suggests a finding that the breach of that duty is
potentially anticompetitive. Whether the legislature would find that
the conduct is anticompetitive absent market power or in spite of
procompetitive justifications requires a harder look.
a. The Neutrality Position
Regulation should not influence antitrust analysis where the
competition-enhancing regulatory duty does not directly influence
marketplace behavior. For example, regulation that creates an obligation
to file reports on market conditions with a government agency would
bear little relation to marketplace competition. Duties of that sort have
no bearing whatsoever on the application of the antitrust laws, and those
laws should thus apply as if the regulatory statute did not exist.
Where a legislature seeks to enhance competition by influencing
marketplace behavior, however, its requirements will likely have some
relevance to antitrust analysis, and this degree of separation will be
inappropriate.
b. Treating Regulatory Violations as Predatory Acts Where
Market Power Is Shown and the Defendant Has
Inadequate Procompetitive Justifications
A legislature’s decision to require certain conduct in order to facilitate
greater competition would, by definition, equate to a finding that a
defendant’s failure to engage in the required conduct may have some
anticompetitive effect. Given that competitive effects are difficult to
measure, courts should defer to this legislative finding. That conduct
may lessen competition, however, does not mean that it actually does.
Generally, a firm without market power is incapable of significantly
reducing consumer welfare because consumers have other options. And
even firms with market power may show that anticompetitive conduct
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simultaneously promotes competition to such an extent that, on balance,
the conduct would not violate the antitrust laws. Where the legislature’s
findings are unclear, the plaintiff should be required to rebut a
defendant’s procompetitive justifications.
This degree of separation differs from the neutrality position only in
that a plaintiff that establishes the defendant’s market power in the
relevant market need not also demonstrate that the allegedly predatory
conduct is likely to have a substantial anticompetitive effect.154 The
plaintiff would also retain the burden of responding to any procompetitive
justification proffered by the defendant. Some regulatory statutes may
support relieving the plaintiff of even more burdens. Those possibilities
are considered below.
c. Identifying Predatory Acts Unless a Procompetitive
Purpose Is Proven
In some cases, a regulatory statute might place regulatory duties on
firms that do not have market power. It might adopt this approach where
the cooperative conduct was deemed essential to effective competition,
and waiting for the marketplace to punish uncooperative competitors
without market power would be needlessly wasteful. This sort of
legislative finding is analogous to the so-called quick look approach.155
In general, courts must exercise great caution in dispensing with market
power analysis. Where the legislature has determined that certain
conduct is essential to competition irrespective of market power,
however, courts should typically reach the same conclusion.
Whenever antitrust liability may rest on firms without market power,
there is a greater danger that conduct without anticompetitive effect will
be subject to punishment. It will therefore be appropriate in most cases
to give the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate a procompetitive
justification for its conduct that could not be achieved without violating
the regulatory requirement.

154. In a private action, a plaintiff would also need to demonstrate that it suffered
antitrust injury and otherwise had standing to pursue the action. See Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–46 (1983);
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
155. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–59
(1986).
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d. Acts that Are Predatory Per Se if Market Power Is Proven
In other cases, the legislature may indicate, expressly or impliedly,
that it intends to place regulatory duties only on firms with market
power. Even where the legislature does not explicitly mention market
power, the regulatory duties it imposes may rest on the assumption that
the burdened firms possess it. As a regulatory program unfolds and
competitive conditions in the marketplace change, a firm’s dominance
may wane. Thus, the prudent course would often be to require the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant has market power before finding that
the antitrust laws are violated.
At the same time, however, the statute may indicate that the legislature
has considered, and rejected, the possibility of procompetitive
justifications for the failure to undertake particular conduct. This finding
may be inferred from specific, compulsory regulatory requirements.
e. Per Se Condemnation
Finally, a legislature may condemn a competitive practice so strongly
and without regard to market power that courts should treat that practice
as a per se violation of the antitrust laws. A court should adopt this level
of connection very cautiously. The legislature must clearly communicate
that violating the specific duty would have no redeeming virtues. As
with the prior degree of separation, the duty must be compulsory and
void of exceptions. Beyond that, the penalty should be harsh. For example,
if a regulatory statute subjected violators to criminal penalties or stiff civil
fines, per se analysis under the antitrust laws might be appropriate.
Courts are generally reluctant to identify conduct as per se illegal under
the antitrust laws without substantial experience with the practice.156 But
where the legislature decides that certain conduct is anticompetitive in a
particular industry, and adopts strong remedies against it, the courts need
not make the difficult decision. The legislature has reached a conclusion
that the courts may safely implement.
As a practical matter, no practice is per se illegal in all circumstances.
Even price fixing requires some inquiry into market conditions before it
is condemned.157 Courts implying per se antitrust rules from regulatory
statutes should thus remain alert to the potential need for some
contextual analysis. But like the per se rules against price fixing and
horizontal market division, transgressing a regulatory statute of this type
would create a very strong presumption in favor of an antitrust violation.
156.
157.
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Indeed, the presumption could be even stronger than that for per se rules
generally because the legislature has already decided to prohibit a
practice within a particular industry.
V. SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TELECOM ACT AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
This Part applies the doctrine proposed in Part IV and concludes that
the duties imposed by the Telecom Act can effectively coexist with
antitrust duties. To determine how the 1996 Act should affect antitrust
analysis, courts need to differentiate between the two sets of duties
imposed by the Act. Certain duties apply to all telecom providers while
others apply only to ILECs. In either case, a court should presume that
(1) a violation of the Act substantially contributes to the maintenance of
an ILEC’s market power, but (2) a plaintiff should retain the burden of
rebutting procompetitive justifications proven by the defendant. For
duties placed on all competitors, the court should not require proof of
market power. For ILEC only duties, however, the court should demand
proof of market power before shifting the burden to the defendant to come
forward with a procompetitive justification. The final Section addresses
the types of antitrust claims that would be entitled to this presumption.
A. Imposing Antitrust Duties Would Not Undermine the
Effectiveness of the Telecom Act
The duties generally imposed by the antitrust laws would not conflict
with the means used by the Telecom Act to achieve its procompetitive
goals. The 1996 Act is designed to foster competition in local telephone
service by requiring ILECs to provide potential competitors with the
means to enter the market. While the antitrust laws do not typically
compel the sort of cooperation required by the Act, it is also not the type
of cooperation that would ordinarily raise competitive concerns. For
example, the Act requires ILECs to interconnect with competitors.
Network markets are usually interconnected because consumers demand
it. Bank ATM machines, methods of computer file transfer, and long
distance telephone service are examples of situations in which
consumers demand interconnection and marketplace forces lead to it.
Thus, there is little fear that imposing antitrust duties would lead a firm
to refuse to interconnect as required by the Act.
Similarly, the Act requires ILECs to sell local service at wholesale
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prices and essentially rent network elements—component parts of the
network needed to provide local service—to their competitors. Many
manufacturers do essentially the same thing without raising antitrust
concern. For example, film manufacturers wholesale film for private
label sale in competition with their own branded product, and
automobile manufacturers provide parts, and sometimes even entire cars,
to competitive manufacturers.
One might argue that the extensive sharing requirements that the 1996
Act imposes on the ILECs extend beyond the sort of sharing
arrangements that we see in unregulated markets. At some point,
enforced duties to share must have anticompetitive consequences that
would conflict with the duties imposed by the antitrust laws. As Justice
Breyer explained in his concurrence in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities
Board:
It is in the unshared, not in the shared, portions of the enterprise that meaningful
competition would likely emerge. Rules that force firms to share every resource
or element of a business would create not competition, but pervasive regulation,
for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant terms.158

The anticompetitive effect of sharing could be particularly pernicious
with respect to innovation. A new firm may not strive to innovate if it
can simply share an incumbent’s technology, and an incumbent’s incentives
to innovate are reduced when it is forced to share the fruits of its labor.159
These potential concerns do not reveal a conflict between the 1996
Act and antitrust duties. Although the statutory language is perhaps
open to the interpretation that anticompetitive sharing is required, it is
open to the alternative interpretation as well. Given Congress’s purpose
to encourage competition, the latter reading of the statute is obviously more
appropriate. Toward that end, the Court has required the FCC to distinguish
those elements that must be shared from those that need not be shared.160
Even if the Act were interpreted to require ILECs to share any
requested element, the duties it imposes would not necessarily conflict
with antitrust duties. After all, the Act does not compel royalty free
sharing. It merely prohibits the ILEC from refusing to share, for a cost
based royalty plus reasonable profit, when a CLEC requests access to an
158. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 429 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that a
firm may not “undertake the investment necessary to produce complex technological
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations
will be dissipated by the sharing requirement”).
160. Id. at 386–95; see id. at 429–30 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Federal Communications Commission Adopts New Rules for Network Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Phone Carriers, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-231344A1.pdf (Feb. 20, 2003).
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element. Competition would persist under such a scheme so long as two
conditions are met. First, competition must be possible in some
elements. If a monopolist could always produce all elements more
efficiently than a competitor, then competition would not emerge. But
the 1996 Act rests on the assumption that all aspects of local telephone
service are not natural monopolies. Second, the royalty must not be set
too low. So long as the royalty properly reflects the ILEC’s cost, plus a
reasonable profit,161 competition in that element will emerge whenever a
CLEC can produce the element more efficiently. A CLEC would not
request to share an element—and pay a cost-plus-profit-based royalty for
it—unless it could not duplicate the element on its own at a lower cost
than the ILEC. All things being equal, this regime might reduce an
ILEC’s incentive to innovate as compared with a monopoly situation in
which innovations need not be shared. But all things would not be
equal. Congress likely concluded that the competition from CLECs made
possible by the Act would spur more innovation throughout the industry.
While the Act on its face does not appear to raise any conflicts with
antitrust duties, a court should go beyond an examination of the
regulatory methods in the Act and examine other indications of
legislative and regulatory intent. Here again, there is much evidence to
suggest that imposing antitrust duties would not disrupt the regulatory
program. The antitrust savings clauses, the 1996 Act’s legislative
history,162 early FCC commentary,163 and contemporary statements by
the President,164 members of Congress,165 and Joel Klein, then-Assistant
161. Setting an appropriate price through regulation has stirred debate among
regulators, competitors, and the courts. Cf. Iowa Utils. Bd., v. Fed. Communications
Comm’n, 219 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d sub. nom., Verizon Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1665–81 (2002).
162. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (explaining that the savings
clause “prevents affected parties from asserting that the [Act] impliedly preempts other
laws” and that the FCC “should be carrying out the policies of the Communications Act,
and the DOJ should be carrying out the policies of the antitrust laws”); S. REP. NO. 10423, at 17 (1995) (“[T]he provisions of this bill shall not be construed to grant immunity
from any future antitrust action against any entity referred to in the bill.”).
163. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,494 (Aug. 29, 1996) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 51, 90) (explaining that “nothing in [the FCC’s]
regulations is intended to limit the ability of persons to seek relief under the antitrust
laws”).
164. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2002) (“The Act’s emphasis on competition is also reflected in its antitrust savings
clause. This clause ensures that even for activities allowed under or required by the
legislation, or activities resulting from FCC rulemaking or orders, the antitrust laws
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Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ,166 all support the
view that Congress saw antitrust as a helpful supplement to the duties
imposed by the 1996 Act.
Goldwasser expressed concern that antitrust duties might disrupt the
Act’s mandatory negotiation and regulatory dispute resolution
provisions.167 To the extent that this is a concern about remedy, as
explained above, we must remember that federal judges are capable of
tailoring remedies to avoid conflict. A proponent of this view might
argue, however, that the problem arises from the mere filing of a suit
requiring a court to address the merits of a dispute not yet subjected to
the appropriate regulatory channels. But just as judges can tailor
antitrust remedies to avoid regulatory conflict, the primary jurisdiction
doctrine enables a court to tailor the timing of litigation by staying
proceedings in an antitrust case pending the resolution of regulatory
proceedings.168
Goldwasser also alludes to the possibility that antitrust law might
conflict with the 1996 Act because the Act may not have been intended
to pursue procompetitive goals as single mindedly as antitrust law.
While admitting that the duties imposed by the 1996 Act “do not conflict
with the antitrust laws,” Judge Wood described them as “more specific
and far-reaching obligations that Congress believed would accelerate the
development of competitive markets, consistently with universal service
(which, we note, competitive markets would not necessarily assure).”169
While it is certainly true that Congress was concerned about maintaining
universal service and that competition alone would not likely achieve
that goal, the 1996 Act cannot properly be said to have the maintenance
of universal service as a goal. Instead, it sought to dismantle the
regulatory devices that had been used in part to achieve universal service
at the expense of competition in order to enable full competition to
flourish in telephony markets. To be sure, Congress provided a means to
pursue universal service, but it did so in ways that would be consistent

continue to apply fully.” (quoting President Clinton’s statement at the signing of the bill)).
165. See id. at 1281 (quoting statements from Representative Conyers and Senators
Thurmond and Leahy, emphasizing that “ILECs like BellSouth [should] remain subject
to antitrust enforcement”).
166. See Klein, supra note 33, at 7, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
1268.htm (then-Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
explained that antitrust law may serve as a useful backup to the 1996 Act).
167. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that “[t]he elaborate system of negotiated agreements and enforcement established by the
1996 Act” is not “compatible with the procedures that would be used to accomplish the
same result under the antitrust laws”).
168. See Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 301–02 (1973).
169. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401 (emphasis added).
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with full competition.170 Congress’s desire to maintain universal service
therefore does not create any inconsistency between antitrust duties and
the 1996 Act.
B. The Telecom Act’s Effect on the Antitrust Laws
Having rejected complete separation between the Telecom Act and
antitrust law, a court would move to the second step of the analysis to
determine how, if at all, the regulatory statute should affect the application
of antitrust law. This Section concludes that violations of the Act must be
separated into two different categories. First, regulatory duties imposed on
all local carriers should be presumed to have significant anticompetitive
effect regardless of the carrier’s market power. Second, duties imposed
only on ILECs should be presumed to have anticompetitive effects only if
market power is shown. In either case, the plaintiff should bear the burden
of rebutting any procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant.
1. Rejecting the Extreme Forms of Antitrust-Telecom Connection
The two extreme forms of antitrust-telecom connection, complete
neutrality and per se illegality, can be readily rejected. Congress’s
decision to require ILECs to cooperate in certain ways communicates a
legislative judgment that the required cooperation is procompetitive.
That judgment is relevant to antitrust analysis, and thus, the neutrality
position should be rejected.
Courts should also reject the per se degree of separation. Congress
did not mandate specific practices. Rather, it imposed duties in terms
of goals and required competitors to negotiate and agree on the
conduct necessary to achieve those goals. Further, Congress charged
competitors with a duty to implement the Act in the first instance
through private negotiations.171 This structure indicates that Congress
170. In re Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15,982 (1997).
Recognizing the vulnerability of implicit subsidies to competition, Congress
directed the Commission and the states to take the necessary steps to create
permanent universal service mechanisms that would be secure in a competitive
environment. To achieve this end, Congress directed the Commission to strive
to replace the system of implicit subsidies with “explicit and sufficient support
mechanisms.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
171. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89,
104 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The elaborate process of negotiation and arbitration set forth in
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envisioned a wide variety of competitive possibilities.
In addition, Congress chose not to impose harsh sanctions for
violations of the Act. Such a flexible and nonpunitive regulatory
structure indicates that Congress did not make the sort of black and
white findings with respect to particular competitive practices that would
support holding a violation of a regulatory duty per se illegal.
2. Choosing Among the Final Three Degrees of Connection
Requires More Careful Analysis
At a minimum, Congress’s decision to require ILECs to interconnect
and cooperate in certain ways should relieve an antitrust plaintiff of the
burden of showing that an ILEC’s failure to fulfill these duties is likely
to contribute substantially to the maintenance of the ILEC’s market
power. The 1996 Act constitutes a legislative finding that cooperation in
certain areas is necessary to enable competition to serve its usual
consumer-welfare-enhancing function. Courts should not second-guess
that finding.
a. Plaintiffs Must Prove Market Power for ILEC-Specific Duties, But
Not for All LEC Duties
The more difficult question is whether the 1996 Act should also
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving that an ILEC has market
power and that the anticompetitive effect of the ILEC’s noncompliance
outweighs any procompetitive justification that the ILEC may offer.
The language of the statute does not limit the duties imposed to those
ILECs with market power. On the contrary, the Act explicitly imposes
certain duties on all local telephone service providers, even though
CLECs would almost certainly have no market power. Congress’s
decision to impose these duties without regard to market power
demonstrates that it concluded that anticompetitive effects would flow
from any carrier’s violation of these duties. Again, courts should not
second-guess that conclusion.
Conversely, Congress placed certain duties only on ILECs, and it
surely recognized that ILECs have market power. To the extent that the
Act introduces competition into the local telephone service market,
however, such competition should erode the ILECs’ market power over
time. Arguably, if Congress wanted ILEC-specific duties to apply only
to ILECs that retain their market power, it would have included
section 252 indicates that Congress sought to allow ILECs and their competitors to govern
their interconnection relationships directly through specific interconnection agreements
rather than the broadly outlined duties described in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251.”).
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provisions in the statute altering the duties at that time. By failing to
address that contingency, Congress may have signaled a conclusion that
even the ILEC-specific duties should apply regardless of market power.
For the existing set of telecom-antitrust cases, the issue of whether to
require proof of market power makes little practical difference. The
ILECs have it, and plaintiffs will be able to prove it. As long as some
element of local telephone service is best provided by a single company,
the ILECs are likely to maintain their market power. Indeed, Congress
may have assumed that local loops connecting individual customers to
the telephone system would be impossible to duplicate, leaving ILECs
with long lasting market power despite the emergence of competition.
But that could change. PCS or cable telephone service could emerge as
effective competitors to local loop service. Should that happen, a court
would need to carefully consider the impact of treating ILEC-specific
duties as anticompetitive. For example, would requiring interconnection
at any technically feasible point within the ILEC’s network serve the
same competitive ends if the ILEC no longer had market power? Maybe
not. Congress chose not to impose that duty on local carriers unlikely to
have market power. Conversely, effective competition might nonetheless
require one system to serve as a hub to which others can interconnect at
any feasible point. Answering that question will require a careful
analysis of the evolved technological options that will then exist. Until
it can be conclusively demonstrated that ILEC-specific duties would
enhance competition even if the ILEC has no market power, antitrust
plaintiffs should be required to prove that an ILEC has market power.
b. Plaintiffs Must Rebut Procompetitive Justifications
With respect to procompetitive justifications, the Act’s structure
indicates that an antitrust plaintiff should continue to bear the burden of
proof. To be sure, the statute imposes categorical duties without
explicitly recognizing the possibility that competition might be better
served in some other way. Congress’s decision to rely on private
negotiation and mediation, rather than strict regulatory dictates,
however, indicates that it recognized the need for flexibility in finding
the best competitive mix. That recognition within the Act would compel
a court to require a plaintiff to demonstrate either that (1) the defendant
could achieve the procompetitive justifications through means less
restrictive than a violation of the Act, or (2) the anticompetitive effects
outweigh the procompetitive effects.
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C. Evaluating Specific Antitrust Claims
A likely critique of this approach to antitrust-telecom accommodation
is that it would open the door to expensive and protracted litigation over
questionable, if not frivolous, antitrust claims. Given the open-textured
language of the antitrust laws and the contextual nature of their
application, a creative plaintiffs’ lawyer could frame an antitrust claim
out of trivial violations of the Telecom Act, and the ensuing litigation
would stifle competitive initiatives among telephone service providers.
This is a legitimate concern. As with all antitrust doctrine, the
approach put forward here must be applied with careful attention to the
ultimate goal of promoting consumer welfare. Some claims should pose
little debate. Trivial violations of the Act should not be entitled to a
presumption of anticompetitive effect. Conversely, if an ILEC violates
serious duties such as the number portability or equal access
requirements, presuming anticompetitive effect should raise little
concern. This sort of violation bears the typical hallmarks of predatory
conduct. Permitting antitrust claims to be based on violations of that
type would pose little danger of stifling truly consumer—welfareenhancing competition.
Of more concern are claims that ILECs are charging prices that are too
low to allow CLECs to compete. A creative attorney could no doubt
frame a price squeeze, primary-line price discrimination, or predatory
pricing claim as a violation of the 1996 Act. But a presumption of
anticompetitive effect would be inappropriate in these circumstances.
Claims alleging low pricing are treated with a cautious eye because low
prices benefit consumers, and recognizing antitrust claims based on low
pricing could chill what is nearly always a procompetitive practice.172
The Telecom Act cannot reasonably be read to suggest that these
concerns differ in the local telephone service market. Consumers would
not benefit if ILECs charged higher prices for their services.
Most difficult are antitrust claims relating to the duties requiring
ILECs to (1) provide unbundled network elements, (2) sell local service
at wholesale for resale by a competitor, and (3) provide space at their
facilities for a competitor’s equipment.173 Aggressive competition, like
low pricing, nearly always benefits consumers. Permitting antitrust
claims resting on a failure to fulfill these cooperative duties—or worse
172. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
220–22 (1993) (discussing care needed in assessing predatory pricing and primary-line
price discrimination cases); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22–29
(1st Cir. 1990) (discussing care needed in assessing price squeeze claim, particularly in a
regulated industry).
173. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (4), (6).
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yet, presuming that a violation of these duties has anticompetitive
effect—would arguably stifle the business freedom that drives aggressive
competition, just as predatory pricing claims chill price cutting.174
But price cutting and refusing to cooperate pose entirely different
consumer welfare scenarios. Price cutting and consumer welfare
virtually always go hand in hand. Whether consumers are best served by
cooperation or the refusal to cooperate, however, depends on the context
of the decision. In many competitive markets, producers voluntarily
cooperate in all of the ways that the Telecom Act requires of ILECs, and
consumers benefit. Firms effectively (1) rent elements of their business
(for example, banks enable competitors to use their ATMs), (2) sell at
wholesale to their retail competitors (for example, home appliance
manufacturers make their products available for private labeling), and
(3) make available the facilities necessary to enable their customers to
deal with competitors (for example, brokerage firms include information
about competitive mutual funds in their catalogs). Firms make these
accommodations to their competitors because the marketplace demands
it. That is, they can maximize their profits in the face of competition
through cooperation in some areas. And this cooperation effectively
fosters competition on the merits in other areas. In Aspen Skiing Co., the
Court made clear that a firm behaves anticompetitively when it refuses
to cooperate in the face of market conditions that make cooperation
essential to consumer—welfare-enhancing competition in the provision
of the ultimate product.175
The Telecom Act is best viewed as a congressional finding that local
telephone service, like downhill skiing in Aspen, is a market in which
cooperation is necessary to enable competition to fully serve its
consumer-welfare-enhancing function. Put another way, were the local
telephone service market competitive, market conditions would force
providers to cooperate just as market conditions encouraged the
operators of Aspen’s four mountains to cooperate when those mountains
were independently owned.
With local telephone service, however, Congress had to overcome the
chicken and egg problem. Monopoly local providers would not
cooperate unless they were faced with competition. But potential
competitors could not effectively enter the market without cooperation. The
174. See Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1286
(11th Cir. 2002) (describing BellSouth’s arguments).
175. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608–11 (1985).
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1996 Act addresses the chicken and egg problem by mandating the sort of
cooperation that market forces would yield if they could operate. Like
Aspen Skiing Company, ILECs that violate the unbundling, resale, or
collocation duties of the 1996 Act eschew forms of cooperation that would
normally occur in a competitive market.176 A serious violation of any of
these duties should thus be entitled to the presumption that it substantially
contributes to the maintenance of the ILEC’s market power. Encouraging
these forms of cooperation is not anticompetitive. On the contrary, it is the
type of cooperation that arises when marketplace forces drive the market,
and it ultimately benefits consumers.177
VI. CONCLUSION
To a large extent, courts have always made competition policy. The
open-textured language of the Sherman Act has forced them to fill the void.
In the absence of an argument supporting the superiority of the judiciary
over the legislature in the area of competition policy-making, however,
courts should defer to legislative decisions when they can find them.178 A
competition-enhancing regulatory statute like the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 is an example of legislative competition policy. Courts should
not assume, as the Seventh Circuit has, that such a statute frees them of
their obligation to adjudicate antitrust disputes. Nor should courts
assume, as the Second and Eleventh Circuits have, that they can
continue to make competition policy in antitrust cases as they would in
the absence of legislative guidance.
This Article proposes an analytical framework that courts can use to
take proper account of competition-enhancing regulation like the 1996
Act. First, a court must ask whether imposing antitrust duties would
interfere with the operation of the competition enhancing regulatory
program. If antitrust duties would not undermine the regulation, a court
176. Those who disagree with the decision reached in Aspen Skiing Co. will have
more difficulty recognizing the procompetitive impact of the Telecom Act. See Glen O.
Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1217–23 (2002).
177. While it would be inappropriate to dismiss these claims at the pleading stage,
a plaintiff’s burden to prove market power and to rebut procompetitive justifications
should enable a court to resolve insubstantial claims against the plaintiff at the summary
judgment stage. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
585–88 (1986).
178. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10–11 (1984). The per se rule
against tying:
reflects congressional policies underlying the antitrust laws. In enacting § 3 of
the Clayton Act . . . Congress expressed great concern about the anticompetitive
character of tying arrangements. . . . While this case does not arise under the
Clayton Act, the congressional finding made therein concerning the
competitive consequences of tying is illuminating, and must be respected.
Id.
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should ask how the legislature’s competition policy should influence the
court’s role as a policy maker in adjudicating antitrust claims. In the
case of the Telecom Act, Congress has declared certain cooperative
conduct procompetitive. Courts should defer to that legislative policy
judgment and presume that serious violations of the Telecom Act are
anticompetitive.
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